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Sharing the Cathedral
RASHMI DYAL-CHAND

Sharing is an indispensable part of American property law, often
mediating the harsh implications of ownership rights. Yet sharing is
also a hidden component of this legal structure. In both theory and
doctrinal manifestations, sharing is overshadowed by the iconic
property right of exclusion. This Article argues that property law
suffers a critical loss from its under-recognition of sharing because
it fails to use sharing to correct distributional failures in a world of
increasingly scarce resources. Sharing could be the basis for
developing a rich range of outcomes in common property disputes.
Instead, as described by Calabresi and Melamed in their famed
article on remedies, outcomes are tagged to exclusion in the form of
blanket property rules and “keep out” signs. As a result, sharing
currently functions merely to create very narrow exceptions to broad
rights of ownership. To correct this failure, this Article presents a
model for sharing as a preferred outcome in property disputes.
Sharing as an outcome is a powerful means of addressing property
inequalities, limiting harmful externalities, preserving efficiency,
and harnessing the extraordinary potential of outcomes in property
law.
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Sharing the Cathedral
RASHMI DYAL-CHAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing is a core feature of American property law. Implied
easements, such as those of prescription or estoppel, are one example.1
They appear in the interstices of property rights, at times when the hard
edges of ownership overly limit what parties actually want to do with their
property.2 In such cases, courts require landowners to share their land by
creating rights of way for use by others.3 Indeed, servitudes of many
kinds, both those imposed by courts and those voluntarily assumed by
owners,4 are living examples of property sharing. So are nuisance cases, in
which courts require owners to provide support,5 access to light,6 or even

*

Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. For very helpful comments, I thank Libby
Adler, Gregory Alexander, Lee Breckenridge, Nestor Davidson, Peter Enrich, Kristin Madison, Mary
O’Connell, Joseph William Singer, James Smith, Kara Swanson, and participants in the Property
Works in Progress Workshop at Fordham Law School, the Association of Law, Property & Society
Annual Meeting at the University of Minnesota Law School, and the University of Georgia School of
Law Faculty Colloquium. I am particularly grateful to Gregory Alexander for the opportunity to think
hard about “progressive property” in a panel on the subject at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in
Honolulu and to Joseph William Singer for his generous advice on the practical and theoretical
foundations for this Article. For his invaluable research assistance and good humor, I am very grateful
to Jeremiah Meyer-O’Day.
1
For examples of prescriptive easements, see Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d
584, 586–87, 590 (Cal. 1984); Houghton v. Johnson, 887 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008);
and Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176, 181–84 (N.M. 2002). For examples of easements by estoppel,
see Pinkston v. Hartley, 511 So. 2d 168, 169–70 (Ala. 1987); Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 810 (Cal.
1906); and Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 515 S.E.2d 291, 297–300 (Va. 1999). See generally JON
W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND (2013) (presenting
an in-depth explanation of the law of easements).
2
See infra Part II.B.
3
See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, § 4:1 (“Courts are willing to graft an easement onto a land
transaction in order to do justice in a particular case.”).
4
Express easements and covenants originate as agreements between private parties, though they
may of course be enforced by courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. note
§§ 1.1–1.2 (2000) (defining servitudes as including easements, profits, and covenants, which are
created by both landowners and the courts).
5
See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1127–28 (Cal. 1981) (holding that an
uphill landowner had a duty of care to a downhill landowner); Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220,
228–29 (1815) (holding that there is an obligation to provide lateral support); Friendswood Dev. Co. v.
Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978) (finding an obligation to provide subjacent
support).
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in a sense, clean air. In copyright law, the venerated doctrine of fair use
protects sharing.8 Future interests in estates embody sharing.9 The list of
examples is almost endless.
As ubiquitous as sharing is, it is decidedly not the thematic foundation
of property law. Instead, the conceptual opposite of sharing, exclusion, has
that distinction.10 Although such a connection is by no means intrinsic,
property theory has quite successfully positioned exclusion as perhaps the
defining characteristic of property ownership.11 The consequence is an
overarching view of property law as protecting owners by excluding nonowners. Both property theory and property practice appear to rely on this
view as a presumptive means of enhancing property’s role as a stable basis
for market transactions.12 Property theory does so by emphasizing title as
the first-order decision in property law.13 Property practice aligns itself
6
Prah v. Maretti is the paradigmatic case that recognized such a right. 321 N.W.2d 182, 191
(Wis. 1982). Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. represents the strong majority
rule where such a right is not recognized. 114 So.2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
7
A very recent decision exploring this question is the Second Circuit’s opinion in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., in which the court held that the plaintiff states and private nonprofit
organizations had stated a claim against the defendant power companies for harms related to climate
change under the federal common law of public nuisance. 582 F.3d 309, 358, 366, 369, 371 (2d Cir.
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
8
For a paradigmatic example discussing the doctrine of fair use, which promotes the sharing of
ideas, see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263–64, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2001).
9
See A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 195 (1961)
(“[L]andowners . . . abuse[d] the power of free alienation of land, by imposing upon that land forms of
settlement which made it impossible for their successors in title (usually their children) to deal with it
as freely as they themselves had been able to do.”).
10
See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997) (“[P]roperty rights can be fully
explained using the concepts of exclusion and use.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730–31 (1998) (stating that the right to exclude is the “sine qua non” of
property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1857 (2007) (“[T]he core of property is the simple right of an owner to exclude.”); Henry E.
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2004) (stating that property rules
use an “‘exclusion’ strategy”). Professor Penner especially has acknowledged the complementarity of
exclusion and sharing, but he argues that although it is important, sharing cannot occur without a strong
right of exclusion. James E. Penner, Ownership, Co-Ownership, and the Justification of Property
Rights, in PROPERTIES OF LAW 166, 166–67 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006).
11
For an influential example, see Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1691, 1693–94 (2012), stating that “property defines things using an exclusion strategy of ‘keep
off’ or ‘don’t touch’ and then enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using
governance strategies.” Compelling examples of quite alternative definitions of ownership exist in
property scholarship. For a prominent example, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753 (2009).
12
See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 10–11 (1989) (stating that
property rights help structure and determine the economic system).
13
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35. The emphasis on entitlement and ownership is so ubiquitous in
modern property law as to appear immovable. Indeed, even the iconic piece of legal scholarship
questioning the pragmatic value of ownership, Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral article, began with
the assumption that entitlements are the first-order decision. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
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with theory in much the same way. The paradigmatic property disputes
may well be those in which a decision about ownership determines the
outcome and that outcome amounts to exclusion. Adverse possession, with
its test for deciding who has exclusive rights to a disputed property, is a
prominent example.14
As a result, sharing appears as the exception to the rule of exclusion. It
is understated, and often implicit, in its effects. Implied easements are
exemplary in this respect too. They are, broadly speaking, an exception to
trespass. Trespass is the rhetorical darling of property law; implied
easements have no rhetorical force.15 Similarly, even as they facilitate the
marketability of property by policing private agreements about sharing,16
restrictive covenants carry the rhetorical banner of being “disfavored” in
the law.17 Affirmative covenants, which may be seen as the most
aggressive examples of sharing within the law of servitudes, are doctrinally
the most disfavored.18 Fair use is the exception to copyright’s monopoly.19
Additionally, in practice, sharing appears as an exception not just to
the rule of exclusion, but also to the right of exclusion. It is to the sense of
Blackstonian title that courts typically create inroads. When courts
recognize that enforcing rights of exclusion will derogate from the
intentions, expectations of fairness, or sense of reliance by either or both
1090 (1972). For a response to Calabresi and Melamed, arguing that even this acknowledgement does
not adequately capture the importance of entitlements in property law, see Jules L. Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1347 (1986).
14
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.12, at 78–80 (7th ed. 2007)
(discussing adverse possession and its impact); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1122–26 (1985) (outlining the test for adverse
possession); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56, 60 (1987)
(discussing easements by prescription, the requirements of which parallel adverse possession).
15
Merrill, supra note 10, at 747; Penner, supra note 10, at 166–67.
16
See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 48–49, 51, 55 (1994) (discussing some of the ways restrictive
covenants are used to police agreements and mollify parties).
17
See, e.g., Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence Cnty. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407, 408
(Mo. 1986) (en banc) (“It is a well-established rule that restrictive covenants are not favorites of the
law . . . .”).
18
See, e.g., Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (noting that precedent established that a “covenant which burdens property does not run with the
land”); Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 834, 836 (N.Y. 1959) (explaining
that the long-standing rule, which provided that affirmative covenants do not run with the land, was
based on “a desire to prevent burdensome incumbrances upon title”). The Restatement (Third) of
Property reflects this discomfort with affirmative covenants by placing temporal limits on them. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.12(1) (2000) (“A covenant to pay money or provide
services terminates after a reasonable time if the instrument that created the covenant does not specify
the total sum due or a definite termination point.”).
19
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–68 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The
exceptions carved out for [criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research] are
at the heart of fair use’s protection of the First Amendment, as they allow later authors to use a
previous author’s copyright to introduce new ideas or concepts to the public.”).
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parties, they veer instinctively in the direction of sharing. A striking
example is trespass. Time and again, courts have created exceptions to
owners’ rights to exclude on the basis of competing rights, such as racial
equality20 or free speech,21 or even more broadly in the name of the public
interest.22 This too is not preordained. Courts could leave ownership in a
more absolute state and instead require sharing through their fashioning of
remedies. Thus, in trespass disputes, courts could avoid searching for an
equal and opposing right, and instead evaluate whether the alleged
trespasser demonstrated a need to use the owner’s property and whether
such a need could be answered by a limited opportunity to share.
Indeed it is somewhat ironic that courts recognize sharing by creating
exceptions to rights rather than by more actively fashioning remedies to
enforce sharing. In doing so, they regularly fail to respond to the core
problem of exclusion that they are drawn to redressing. They may
recognize a right of a non-owner that compels limiting the property rights
of the owner. But because ownership is so determinative of outcome,
courts are terribly constrained in the remedies they can provide. The right
of free speech can only provide very limited opportunities to share
property owned by another, and only when that right is compelling enough
to overcome the owner’s property right in the first instance.23 In nuisance
cases, even in the face of significant harm, damages may be awarded rather
than injunctions that require the sharing of space, air, and peace when the
offending owner exercises her rights in a manner that is deemed more
“socially valuable.”24
In these examples, sharing exemplifies a broader problem of
impoverished outcomes in property law. A glaring example is the doctrine
of adverse possession. While there are many cases in which the parties
could reasonably be required to share, such as by sharing use, by leaving
20
See, e.g., Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434–36 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a salon owner could not exclude a customer based on race because doing so constituted a refusal to
perform a contract for hair styling services); Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 710 F. Supp.
1288, 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and stating
there was a genuine issue as to whether a store owner discriminated against the plaintiffs by refusing
entry based on race).
21
See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628–33 (N.J. 1980) (holding that under the state
constitution, speech could receive protection on certain private property and the university could be
restricted from excluding students based on political speech).
22
See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (“[W]e see no legitimate need for a right in
the farmer to deny the worker the opportunity for aid available from federal, State, or local services, or
from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist him.”).
23
Consider, for example, the extraordinary limitations on the right of the canvassers in the famous
Pruneyard case. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980) (“PruneYard may
restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any
interference with its commercial functions.”).
24
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) & cmt. f (1979) (discussing payment for the
harm as a remedy rather than stopping the activity causing such harm).
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use with the adverse possessor and the power to transfer with the “true”
owner, or by dividing ownership over time, the remedy in these cases is
“all or nothing”—either completely bundled ownership or ejection for the
adverse possessor.25 In a context of increasingly scarce resources and ever
more inequality of distribution, the blunt power of “keep out” injunctions
leaves decisions about resource use and allocation entirely in the hands of
private owners.26 This occurs despite the instinct of courts to achieve
broader distribution. Property outcomes have the potential to address acute
problems of fairness and distributive justice to a much greater extent than
they currently do. By the same token, a richer palette of property
outcomes could alleviate the harsh externalities that result from ignoring
the uses of property made by non-owners. It is a current and compelling
problem in property law that the impulse to share often remains inchoate
and, more broadly, that injunctions are often equated with “keep out”
signs.
This Article provides a basis for responding to the impulse to share.
Although a rich and vibrant literature has explored the power of outcomes
in property law,27 this Article argues that a few foundational assumptions
undergirding this literature have obscured what would otherwise be plain.
This literature builds upon Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed’s famed legal realist article on remedies, which recognizes that
the definition of a property entitlement changes markedly when it is
assigned a value and remedied by means of a liability rule (typically in the
form of damages or compensated injunctions) instead of a property rule
25

See infra Part II.B.
Smith, supra note 10, at 1728.
27
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092 (focusing on the “decisions [that] go to the
manner in which entitlements are protected,” which “shape the subsequent relationship between the
winner and the loser”); see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995) (discussing the ability of
liability rules to “catalyze consensual trade”); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091–93, 2096 (1997) (attempting to clarify
“whether legal protection via a property or a liability rule should be conferred to holders of particular
sorts of assets,” and in doing so examining the outcome of choosing one “legal rule that minimizes the
transactional imperfections that occur in securing the transfer of assets from one person to another”);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713, 715, 718 (1996) (applying a “systematic economic analysis” to argue that liability
rules are superior to property rules contrary to paradigms on property and liability rules); John A.
Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2005) (proposing that the “overall servitude regulation
framework” can be improved through “three significant pliability rule refinements” to section 4.8(3)
and an additional revision to section 4.11 of the Restatement (Third) of Property); Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175–77 (1997) (arguing that the interplay between
remedies and entitlements is deeply influenced by the common law context—of torts, contracts, or
property—in which that interplay is embedded); Smith, supra note 10, at 1728 (arguing that property
rules are, in general, superior to liability rules as a consequence of property’s exclusion strategy).
26
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(typically in the form of an injunction or the denial of liability). Even the
most rhetorically Blackstonian vision of property ownership can look a
good deal less absolutist and a good deal more relational when remedied
by something less than an injunction to keep out.29
What the literature does not dwell on is the potential for property
injunctions to achieve sharing. Using a vantage point provided by another
realist, Oliver Wendell Holmes,30 this Article explores that potential.31 By
adapting a basic prescription propounded by Holmes largely in the realm
of contract law,32 this Article develops a model for enhancing property
outcomes and, in particular, for promoting sharing as a preferred outcome
in core doctrinal areas, such as those involving claims of nuisance, adverse
possession, implied easements, and trespass. The model is intended for use
in cases where legitimate interests to disputed property exist on more than
one side of the dispute. In such cases, a determination of title should not
be determinative of outcome. The model provides a basic template for
evaluating the legitimate interests of parties in a dispute over property, not
initially for the purpose of determining rights, but rather to pursue an
outcome involving sharing. By doing so, the Article argues, legal decision
makers can produce a much richer range of outcomes.
This Article advances two central claims, one theoretical and one
pragmatic, followed by a prescription. It is organized accordingly. First,
at the level of theory, it matters a great deal whether property law is
grounded in a sharing model or in a model focused on exclusion. A system
of property law that relies on exclusion orients attention toward the
question of which one party has formal title, and away from an inquiry into
what interests underlie any given dispute over property. The result often is
28

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106–1110 (discussing the effects of shifting from
a property rule to a liability rule).
29
See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 1–5 (2003)
(explaining that the idea of property remains grounded in the notion of sacrosanct monopolies held by
the owner when in reality property is regulated, albeit more or less in certain instances). Compare 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (stating that property allows for total exclusion of others),
with JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 6–18 (2000) (stating that
the current ownership model is “misleading and morally deficient” because it conceives a condition in
which a property owner believes she can use her property without regards to others when in fact
property is subject to governmental regulation).
30
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173–74
(1920) (providing a pragmatic perspective when comparing eminent domain and wrongful conversion
by inquiring, “[w]hat significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point
of view of the law?”).
31
I should note here that there are other powerful frameworks for exploring exactly this issue.
For an example of a framework besides the ownership model, see AJ VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN
THE MARGINS 12–15 (2009).
32
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 215 (45th prtg. 1923). In Part II.C, I
discuss in detail this two-part prescription, in which Holmes proposes to allocate a remedy on the basis
of defining a group by a common set of facts.
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that the party who is judged to have title wins a broad “keep out”
injunction, and it is more difficult to think of solutions that require sharing
even if those solutions ought to be evident. Although examples of sharing
are all around us, our over-focus on the exclusion model makes it hard for
us to see their ubiquity, pervasive quality, and importance to our system of
law. Moreover, the particular focus of this Article is that over-reliance on
the exclusion model limits our imagination in developing superior
outcomes in property disputes that have the potential to protect more
legitimate interests in valued resources.
Part II develops this claim first by examining an alternative to an
exclusion model that existed (perhaps surprisingly) in medieval times. At
a basic level, the medieval system of writs in property law focused directly
on outcome and on property use, paying scant attention to who had formal
title.33 As ownership developed into the adjudicatory starting point in
property law, however, the sharing inherent in the medieval writ system
was replaced by a model centering on exclusion.34 As Part III then
discusses, by recognizing the importance of outcomes in property law,
Calabresi and Melamed and the many scholars who so creatively built
upon their work could have reclaimed sharing as a critical component of
property law. But partly because they accepted the predominance of title
over outcome, and partly because they equated title with exclusion, they
ignored the potential for injunctions in property disputes to accommodate
sharing. To explore this potential as a theoretical matter, Part IV then
presents an alternative theoretical framework for an outcome-focused
approach grounded in the Holmesian view of the law through a “bad
man’s” eyes. Finally, Part V explicates and develops the model proposed
here, the “interest-outcome approach,” discussing both the theoretical
grounding and the pragmatic potential of the model to better resolve core
property disputes.
Second, as a pragmatic matter, this Article claims that in core doctrinal
areas, courts express the quite respectable instinct to require property
sharing. But because they lack the vocabulary and remedial building
blocks to prioritize sharing as a practice and norm, they miss opportunities
to develop outcomes in property disputes that would require sharing. This
is true despite the fact that in many such disputes sharing solutions would
be superior, both from a fairness and efficiency standpoint, to the “winner
takes all” kinds of outcomes that prevail in a system grounded in the
exclusion model. Think again of adverse possession: courts recognize the
right of the adverse possessor to use an owner’s property, effectively
recognizing that sharing is occurring, but they remedy the situation by
33
34

SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 34–35.
See id. at 35 (stating that today title is rooted in possession, which by nature means exclusion).
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giving the adverse possessor either full ownership or nothing. One striking
feature of these cases is that at some point in the courts’ inquiry, the
instinct to protect and direct sharing is formalistically cabined by the
pressure to find “the owner.” As a result, more parties lose than is
necessary or normatively desirable. A second result is that we have an
underdeveloped range of outcomes in property disputes.
The heart of this Article is its presentation of a model that provides
both a modern and specific template for enriching outcomes in property
law and, in particular, for promoting property sharing. In developing and
applying this model, Part IV turns from critique to prescription. By
reviewing the cases discussed in Part III through the lens of Holmes’s “bad
man,” Part IV considers the much broader range of legitimate interests at
play and outcomes that could have been achieved. Relying in part on
negotiation theory, which prioritizes “interests” over “positions;” in part on
Holmes’s exploration of an outcome-first approach in contract law; and in
part on recent scholarship that disassembles the concept of ownership, Part
IV develops the interest-outcome approach. As this Part demonstrates, by
no means does the model dispose entirely of the inquiry into entitlement.
Instead, the model elaborates on the ways in which property use in
particular can elucidate a range of outcomes.
By concentrating scholarly attention on property interests and
outcomes, this Article challenges us to recognize what courts implicitly
acknowledge all the time: property sharing is integral to property law. But
sharing is also an inchoate feature of our system, with far more potential
than has thus far been fulfilled. By proposing a sharing model for property
law, which would require surprisingly small adjustments in key doctrinal
areas, this Article presents a means for fulfilling some of that potential. As
the experiences of so many courts show, what stands in the way of these
adjustments is rhetoric more than substance. By promoting property
sharing as an outcome, this Article seeks to expand a middle space
between exclusive ownership and a commons. Property sharing can be a
very modern means of addressing distributional concerns. We need only
follow the instincts of judges to learn how.
II. SHARING AS OUTCOME? FROM WRITS TO REALISTS
This Part demonstrates how and why sharing is fundamental to
property law by explicating the connection between sharing and remedies.
In short, when a property law system is focused on outcomes in any given
dispute, it is more likely to recognize opportunities to share. On the other
hand, such opportunities are obscured when the system is focused on the
question of who has proper title, because the imperative then is to ensure
full protection of that title by granting broad rights to exclude.
To elucidate what it means to focus on outcomes, this Part presents
two examples of systems that have done just that, one historical and the
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other theoretical. Section II.A briefly describes the early writ system, in
which property disputes were resolved not by declaring rights of
ownership, but rather by determining who ought to receive possession of
the land in dispute. By separating the question of title and possession, the
early writ system had an inherent mechanism for sharing that was lost
when the early writs were replaced with claims of ownership. Sections
II.B and II.C then turn to an ongoing discussion in property theory about
the relationship between property rights and remedies, which builds on
Calabresi and Melamed’s famous legal realist article. The purpose of these
sections is to further explore the relationship between property outcomes
and property sharing. One way to pose the central question in these
sections is this: Why are outcomes so limited in property law? More
specifically, to what extent can property theory explain the relatively
limited use of injunctions other than as blunt instruments of exclusion?
The answer, as Section II.B discusses, appears to be that a very
influential literature on property outcomes has provided a powerful
explanation for the centrality of exclusive ownership in property disputes,
namely that exclusion is the basis for efficient market transactions. Section
II.C discusses an alternative legal realist approach to property outcomes,
propounded by Holmes, that makes ownership much more marginal.
Finally, Section II.D proposes a new approach to enriching the link
between sharing and outcomes. This approach, the interest-outcome
model, draws on features of the early writ system, Holmes’s framework,
and more modern progressive property scholarship to capitalize on the
benefits of sharing that inhere in an outcome-focused approach.
The remainder of this Article is intended to demonstrate both the
feasibility and the intuitive appeal of the interest-outcome framework. By
reconnecting with the early writ system’s comfort with sharing, the
interest-outcome approach better explains important features of existing
doctrine and, more importantly, expands the range of potential outcomes
that promote legitimate interests and protect important values in our legal
system.
A. Real-Actions in the Early Common Law: A Question of Seisin
The notion that shared outcomes, rather than title, could be the primary
focus in resolving legal disputes is not new. Indeed, the common law
system of writs providing rights of actions to real property operated by
defining rights implicitly and within the context of explicitly defining
remedies.35 The operative legal concept in these writs was that of
35
See CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 92–94 (2d ed. 1983) (looking at the right of
entry); SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 34–43 (“[I]t is never quite clear whether the rules of law were
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36

possession. The writs functioned fundamentally to protect the claim of
better possession.37 It was also, therefore, the proof of better possession
that led to success in such actions.38 The focus on possession rather than
ownership created a natural space for sharing. Indeed, the entire feudal
hierarchy rested on a system of shared interests in land.39
The paradigmatic example is the assize of novel disseisin, in which the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant “unjustly and without judgment hath
disseised him of his freehold,” resulting in a command to the sheriff to
cause “that tenement to be re-seized.”40 The writ required the plaintiff to
have been in possession of the land earlier than the defendant,41 but it does
not appear to have required any claim of right to the land—leave alone any
claim of “proprietorship” or anything akin to absolute ownership.42 As
described by Professor Simpson, “[w]hatever the real action, the end
product is the same.”43
The point of the writ appears, more than anything, to have been to
provide immediate relief to a party who believed himself44 unjustly
dispossessed of land.45
The immediacy of remedy alleviated the
difficulties that ensued when the dispossessed party engaged in self-help to
regain possession of the land.46 In a very real sense, the question of who
had greater rights to the land was simply too abstract and extraneous to the
dispute to matter much. The plaintiff sought the court’s attention
principally because he sought possession, not because he sought a
declaration, adjudication, or opinion about whether the land was rightfully
sanctioned by an appropriate procedure, or whether the rules were developed to explain the existing
procedure; the truth no doubt in many cases was that law and procedure grew together.”). For a
differing view on the origins and functions of these writs that focuses more on the integration of
substance and process to solve legal problems, see S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 119–32 (1969).
36
DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93 (“In the twelfth century, the concept of seisin was
virtually identical to actual (or de facto) possession.”).
37
See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37 (“For many purposes seisin and possession need not be
distinguished . . . . In the writ of right it is not ownership of land, but seisin of land, which is
sought . . . .”).
38
DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93.
39
Id.; SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37.
40
ANTHONY FITZ-HERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM 177 (9th ed. 1794).
41
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (emphasizing possession of the land); SIMPSON,
supra note 9, at 35–37 (“[T]he person who can base his title upon the earliest seisin is best entitled to
recover seisin.”).
42
DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92.
43
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35. Similarly, as described by Professors Donahue, Kauper, and
Martin, “[t]he question of ultimate right never came up.” DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93.
44
This Section uses the male pronoun to acknowledge the historical context. The remainder of
the Article will use gender inclusive pronouns.
45
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 28–29.
46
See id. at 30 (discussing how a dispossessed party only had four days to engage in self-help and
after that time the party had to seek a remedy by bringing a writ of right).
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his.
Obviously, the feudal system of land tenure quite meaningfully
diluted the ultimate question of right,48 but by no means did it have to
dilute it entirely. Greater, though not ultimate, title could have driven the
outcome. It could also have symbolized interests and consequences
beyond that of possession, as indeed happened over time as new writs
developed.49 Under the early writ system, it did neither. Instead, plaintiffs
focused directly on the ultimate question of outcome in the form of
immediate possession.
But it was not just in the arguably unique context of seeking immediate
possession that the focus on outcome was evident. For example, the writ
of right, though closer in aim to an action for a declaration of right of
ownership, focused on the same question of seisin and the same scope of
proof. Thus, as Simpson has discussed, it would be misleading to describe
this and other real actions of that time as addressing the question of
proprietorship.50 Indeed, despite its name, it would even be misleading to
describe the writ of right as primarily addressing questions of right. The
focus, as with the other writs of that era, was on the desired outcome of
access to and use of land even while that land was, in important respects,
shared with others.
As Simpson and others have described, the writ system developed in
such a way as eventually to emphasize title over outcomes.51 Simpson
attributes this development to the difficulty of using the older writs just
described.52 They evolved over time into technical and complicated
devices that, contrary to their original straightforward intent and function,
became unwieldy and inefficient to use.53 New forms of action, such as
actions in trespass and for ejectment, developed in their stead, providing
means of recovering land that were capable of easier proof and more
efficient administration.54
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a feature
about these new actions that appears to have been incidental rather than
47
See id. at 35 (“In the writ of right it is not ownership of land, but seisin of land, which is sought,
and the same is true of novel disseisin at the other end of the scheme of writs.”).
48
See EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 42–43 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing writs in the thirteenth century that were concerned not only
with establishing a right, but also with regaining possession of land).
49
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–36.
50
Id. at 35.
51
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94–96 (describing the transformation of the writ system
to focus on the legalistic concept of title).
52
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 39–41.
53
See id. at 39–42 (explaining how the law of seisin grew to be a complicated body of law); see
also DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94–95 (describing seisin as “transform[ing] . . . from a simple
concept to a virtual mystery”).
54
See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42 (describing the development of trespass and other personal
actions).
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fundamental to their ascendance. Though disputed, Professor Holdsworth
has described these newer actions as replacing the older focus on better
possession with a notion of absolute ownership.55 What became important
was for the plaintiff to prove his right of ownership (and the defendant’s
defect in title).56 Such proof would entitle the plaintiff to broad injunctive
relief rather than the more limited opportunity to possess, the latter of
which was constrained both temporally and by the rights of use of others
under the older system of writs.57 In the course of this transformation,
remedies were relegated to a secondary level of inquiry intended to protect
those rights, namely the more absolute rights of ownership that judges
determined to be worthy.58
Following this view of the ascendance of the new forms (of trespass
and ejectment) over the old (of seisin), it appears that it was not
considerations of more efficient resource allocation and management that
resulted in a more absolute understanding of ownership. Rather, it was
perhaps, more than anything, the problem of proof.59 Proof of ownership
was easier to produce than proof of better or more worthy possession.60
Proof of ownership did not require evidence of use, productivity, length of
tenure, or even possession. Over time, it simply required a statement
concerning title.61 Moreover, it resulted in much less potential for
conflicting claims of right or interest because ownership, unlike
possession, was treated in a hierarchical manner.62 Although the early
writs very often gave possession just to one party, it was possible for two
parties to have equal rights of possession.63 But title was a question of
exclusivity.64 Ownership thus became a much more crystalline means of

55

7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 63–64 (2d ed. 1937).
Id.
57
DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94.
58
See id. (“[T]he law concerning the title to land was ‘elaborated to serve the needs of policy and
justice,’ and, since seisin lay at the root of all title, the concept was correspondingly refined, modified
and elaborated.” (quoting SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 38)).
59
See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42 (“[T]he real actions did become grossly unsatisfactory. In the
fifteenth century considerable use was made of trespass and other person actions to try title to land.”).
60
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (explaining that the burden of proof was difficult in
an action for writ of entry which led to the development of other actions that focused on the question of
title).
61
SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42.
62
Compare DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94 (discussing the “relativistic nature” of seisin),
with id. at 96 (noting that seisin was replaced with a “notion of absolute ownership”), and SIMPSON,
supra note 9, at 42 (discussing the ascendance of the concept of “best title”).
63
See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining that “any person who acquires seisin acquires
thereby a title,” thus suggesting that two people could have established title to the same land).
64
See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 55, at 79 (showing that in an action for ejectment, a person was
required to prove that he had an “absolute right,” which suggests that title was proven by displaying
exclusive ownership).
56
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65

supporting one’s claim to property. Crucially, once title was determined,
it also dictated remedy,66 thereby lightening the entire decision-making
burden. Given the importance of administrative efficiency to the very
concept of justice and the rule of law,67 these virtues of ownership cannot
be overstated, nor can they be relegated to the past. Problems of proof and
efficient administration are entirely modern problems.
Leaving proof to the side for now, however, it is worth pausing over
what was lost in the transition to the newer forms of action. The medieval
experience with property-related writs does not suggest that allocating
property on the basis of possession rather than ownership was either
unnatural or wasteful of property resources. Indeed, as experience with
such writs as that of novel disseisin suggests, it appears to have been more
natural to address the question of possession directly because it was the
ultimate question that concerned the parties.68 It was the use of an
important resource that mattered, not the question of what title to that
resource symbolized.69 In the early days of the writ system, then, there
was a very robust connection between property use and efficiency. The
legal system was structured in such a way as to monitor directly the ways
in which property was used so as to ensure efficiency. Critically, as courts
of equity developed nuanced injunctions over the next several centuries,
these remedies replaced the early writs as a means of maintaining that
connection.70 Over time, as title became a proxy for more and more
interests and, ultimately, outcomes, that close connection between legal
rules (or writs) and productive property use became more attenuated.
Eventually, more legal rules in property law were structured so owners
could determine the best uses of the property.71 One influential view in
modern property law is that the reframing of property rules in favor of
owners’ determinations about uses was advantageous as a matter of
65
See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988)
(explaining that property rules are “hard-edged” like crystals).
66
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94 (explaining that forcible entry as a remedy became
illegal unless ordered by a judge after title was determined).
67
See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 3 (2002)
(“A thin theory [of rule of law] stresses the formal or instrumental aspects . . . that any legal system
allegedly must possess to function effectively as a system of laws.”).
68
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (explaining that plaintiffs sought to recover the
seisin of land); SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37 (explaining that in the writ of right, the parties were
concerned with seisin of land and that seisin and actual possession are interchangeable concepts).
69
See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (noting that plaintiffs sought to recover seisin of the
land and not a right to ownership).
70
See SINGER, supra note 29, at 101 (crediting the equity courts with inventing the doctrines of
easement by estoppel and constructive trusts); Charles Donahue, Jr., What Happened in the English
Legal System in the Fourteenth Century and Why Would Anyone Want to Know?, 63 SMU L. REV. 949,
954, 957 (2010) (discussing the expansion of the writ of trespass and the development of the
predecessor to the modern trust).
71
Smith, supra note 10, at 1728.
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administrative and economic efficiency.
But with that reframing, a second connection became more attenuated,
and it is a connection that is hauntingly familiar in modern property law.
In the medieval writ system, the direct manipulation of uses produced
broad access to and use of land at a time when land oligarchy was quite
obviously an exceptional burden.73 Although ultimate ownership could not
be the subject of adjudication, use and possession could be, and by
distributing such uses more broadly, property law was able to achieve
much distributive justice.74 When rights were defined and consolidated in
the form of proprietorship claims, and information costs reduced thereby,75
property law surrendered its capacity to directly accomplish broad
distribution of uses. As Section II.D discusses, then and now, this new
balance produced new externalities, some of them negative.76
Finally, while proof of property claims became easier with the turn to
absolute ownership, the possibility of shared property interests became
much more remote. Although it was largely implicit, the imperative to
share property undergirded the entire medieval system, given the ultimate
right of the crown.77 As freeholds transitioned to fee simple estates, the
convergence of factors that produced a system of broad sharing was
dismantled. Much has been written of the efficiencies gained from
enclosure of the commons.78 But, as even this brief discussion should
remind us, sharing took many more forms than that of a commons. What
we lost in the actual and symbolic deconstruction of the commons was the
latent opportunity to explore the full potential of property sharing in a
72
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, at 33 (4th ed. 1992) (asserting
that an owner’s exclusive right to land is necessary for the land’s efficient use); see also Smith, supra
note 10, at 1728 (“Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses together and delegating
to the owner the choice of how to use the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any stage.”).
73
See BODENHEIMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 42 (explaining that a lessee for years had broader
access to land upon the development of new writs in the thirteenth century because he or she had a new
right to recover possession).
74
See id. (describing the development of writs which allowed lessees to recover possession of
land). Of course the modern concern over the question of muddying ownership is that it impedes
alienability and efficiency. But as Part III demonstrates, shared uses can be just as efficient as
exclusive title. See infra Part III. Moreover, recent scholarship has provided us with excellent and
numerous examples in which limiting alienability can be normatively desirable. See, e.g., Lee Anne
Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1451–57 (2009) (presenting circumstances in
which restricting alienability “might work better than placing pressure on (or only on) property’s other
margins—acquisition, use, and exclusion”).
75
Smith, supra note 10, at 1728.
76
See infra Part II.D (showing that proprietorship claims that focus on formal title do not address
the legitimate interests of both parties).
77
See BODENHEIMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 48–49 (discussing the ultimate power of the king to
decide disputes over land).
78
See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1074 (2005)
(explaining how the enclosure movement was economically efficient).
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system grounded in widely distributed fee simple ownership.

B. Calabresi and Melamed: Built-In Assumptions in a Binary Framework
In their engagement with remedies, the legal realists were the
theoretical counterparts to the early writ system. Therefore, this Section
and the next explore the extent to which the realists’ exploration of legal
outcomes recognized the value of sharing. Given their influence on
property law, this discussion begins with Calabresi and Melamed,
concluding that their particular focus on outcomes did not capture the
possibility of sharing. Section II.C then turns to an alternative realist
approach that has far greater potential to promote sharing.
In writing their 1972 article on remedies in property law, Calabresi and
Melamed elaborated on a core legal realist point made largely in
discussions of contract law by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Karl
Llewellyn.80 They argued that while entitlements are clearly the first order
decisions to be made in a given property dispute, the choice of remedies
fundamentally shapes the very nature of the entitlement.81 Calabresi and
Melamed’s contribution to property theory cannot be overstated. The
introduction of a legal realist perspective into discussions about the
distributional effects of remedies in property disputes has influenced the
development of doctrines at the heart of property law, including nuisance,82
takings,83 concurrent ownership,84 and servitudes.85 Their contribution is
79
We also thereby lost the opportunity to develop legal mechanisms that might help to solve
alienability problems in the presence of shared rights. The Restatement (Third) provides excellent
examples of the possibilities here. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 7.10 cmts. a–c
(2000) (allowing for modification, rather than termination, as a means of preserving servitudes in the
face of new circumstances).
80
See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 10–11 (1962) (exploring the importance of remedies in contract law);
K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83 (1951) (underscoring the notion that in either contract or
property law, an individual has a “primary right” for performance of the contract or exclusive control of
the land and the “secondary right” of the individual is in the form of damages); see also infra Part II.C
(discussing Holmes and his emphasis on determination of remedy before a determination of
entitlement).
81
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090–91 (discussing how the law first establishes
a right to entitlement, but this entitlement is shaped by the state’s choice to intervene and enforce that
right in the form of a remedy).
82
See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,
38–39, 77 (2002) (applying the concept of “pliability rules” to nuisance cases); James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440, 470–71 (1995) (discussing remedies in a nuisance dispute).
83
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 59–60 (discussing a property owner’s rights
when the government exercises its power of eminent domain and the owner is left only with “the right
of ‘just compensation’” as a remedy); id. at 75–77 (applying a pliability rule analysis to an exercise of
eminent domain, in which property is taken and then transferred to a private party).
84
See Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1096–97 (discussing concurrent ownership).
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noteworthy, in part, because it has inspired such substantial thinking about
remedies on the basis of what amounts to a set of rich descriptive
observations.
As many scholars have noted, however, Calabresi and Melamed’s
particular view of the cathedral is also limiting.86 Although much has been
written about how Calabresi and Melamed have shaped remedies analyses
in property law, the literature (somewhat surprisingly) does not examine
the extent to which Calabresi and Melamed’s particular view of the
cathedral has affected the development of approaches in property law that
privilege outcome over title. In truth, the authors’ interpretation of what it
means to focus on outcomes in resolving disputes is just one interpretation,
and as descriptive as their framework appears to be, it superimposes a quite
significant layer of meaning about what remedies do and how they can be
categorized. While the assumptions embedded in the authors’ framework
are significant in their own right, the dominant interpretations of the
authors’ framework that exist in property law scholarship are even more
powerful constraints on the development of an outcome-focused mode of
dispute resolution that incorporates sharing.
Three of the authors’ own assumptions are of particular importance
here. First, Calabresi and Melamed’s framework is binary in the sense that
the authors described two levels of decisionmaking for a given dispute.87
The first level of decisionmaking is to determine who has an entitlement.88
It is only once an entitlement is set that the second level of
decisionmaking, that of determining the appropriate outcome, occurs.89
The remedy, as Calabresi and Melamed described it, is a second order
choice, an important one with distributional consequences, but nonetheless
a switch that is turned on upon the setting of the entitlement.90 Moreover,
the choice of remedy is a one-time decision, which is not revisited over
time or as circumstances between the parties change.91
Of course, the ordering of these two decisions is a substantial nod to
the title-dominating view of property.92 By designating entitlement as the
85
See Lovett, supra note 27, at 77 (promoting the view of servitudes “not as inflexible property
rights, but as evolving relationships between parties with concurrent interests in the same land”).
86
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 15–25 (reviewing scholarship presenting
normative and descriptive challenges to claims made by Calabresi and Melamed).
87
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090–91.
88
Id. at 1090.
89
Id. Of course, such a remedy could be no liability.
90
Id. at 1090–91.
91
This is one of the shortcomings that Bell and Parchomovsky seek to address with the
introduction of their “pliability rules.” Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 38–39.
92
As will be discussed, it is also a meaningful divergence from Holmes, who argued that a
decision maker ought to begin by defining a set of facts that delimit a remedial need. See HOLMES,
supra note 32, at 215 (“There are always two things to be asked: first, what are the facts which make up
the group in question; and then, what are the consequences attached by the law to that group.”).
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switch that turns on remedies, Calabresi and Melamed effectively
concluded that an outcome cannot be set unless and until an entitlement is
defined or redefined.93 Outcomes, in other words, cannot exist in the
absence of pre-defined entitlements, even though it is also the case that
outcomes have the effect of activating a redefinition of entitlements in light
of the chosen outcome. In these respects, entitlements act as on/off
switches for triggering remedies.
Indeed, several of the most influential critiques of Calabresi and
Melamed’s original framework suggest modifications that effectively
create “glider switches” allowing for adjustments in compensation over
time,94 or transitions from injunctions to damages or vice versa.95 These
modifications allow the framework to fit more comfortably in contexts
where access to and ownership of land is contested. In such contexts, the
creation or enforcement of an easement over the course of time, for
example, can act as a glider switch that effectively transfers ownership
while softening the effects of such a transfer by temporal means.96
Similarly, the allowance of a certain “activity level,” for example, dumping
up to a certain level of pollution but not beyond it, can provide for partial
or gradual transfer of ownership.97
Though it is not their apparent intent, such glider switches also
accomplish sharing, though typically only along temporal lines or by
softening the harsh effects of a blunt injunction by an award of damages.
These limited leanings toward sharing reflect a reality that may well differ
from that which Calabresi and Melamed purported to describe. The
original cathedral was glimpsed at a moment when the surrounding
conversation centered on the ramifications of Coase’s insights about the
importance of individual ownership and wealth maximization and their
relationship to exclusion.98 In this context, protecting entitlements with
property rules meant rewarding injunctive relief to one individual. As
diverse views of the cathedral are cataloged, it has become clearer that
such a limited use of injunctions is unduly constraining and harsh.
Calabresi and Melamed’s framework is also binary in another
significant respect, and this is the second assumption underlying the
93

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092−93.
See Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1080−82 (providing an example of temporal division of
property and its effect on bargaining).
95
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 38–39.
96
See id. at 67−68 (describing the versatility of pliability rules in determining the most efficient
and just outcomes).
97
Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1078−80.
98
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 8−11 (recognizing Coase’s intellectual
contribution to the discussion of transaction costs as a catalyst “for all subsequent law and economics
scholars,” but acknowledging that Coase’s article fell short by not discussing “how entitlements should
be protected after the initial allocation”).
94
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framework. The binarism here is in the categorization of remedies: After
determining who is owed an entitlement, Calabresi and Melamed claimed
that a decision maker can choose to protect that entitlement with either a
property rule or a liability rule.99 Property rules enforce the court’s
decision about who receives an entitlement by requiring one who wishes to
take the entitlement to buy it from the holder by means of a voluntary
transaction.100 Liability rules allow others to remove the entitlement from
its holder by paying a predetermined price.101 Calabresi and Melamed also
introduced a third type of remedial rule, inalienability rules, which
preclude the holder from selling the entitlement.102 However, this Article
adopts the prevailing perspective that the theoretical force of Calabresi and
Melamed’s framework is in its binary division between property and
liability rules.103
Despite being binary in this respect, the authors’ original framework
was indisputably capacious, allowing the authors to categorize virtually all
remedies as either property rules, liability rules, or some hybrid of the
two.104 The binarism of the framework was not limiting in the sense that
certain remedies were left out and at risk of underuse as a result. But, of
course, categorization adds meaning, and in this case the authors called a
property rule a “collective decision as to who is to be given an initial
entitlement but not as to the value of the entitlement.”105 How then would
they categorize an injunction requiring a certain amount of sharing? Such
an outcome would presumably fit within the category of liability rules, but
not comfortably so, given the authors’ equation of liability rules with
damages.106 Without such a categorization it seems entirely possible that
injunctive relief could easily have involved more nuanced grants of rights
of access, use, and even exclusion, allowing for the separation of property
interests that are currently bundled.
Obviously the first, but probably also the second of these two
99

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1092−93. Recent scholarship has clarified that inalienability rules play an important role
in property law. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 74, at 1406 (exploring the potential of inalienability
rules to help achieve efficiency).
103
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 4−5 (“[T]he analytical structure devised by
Calabresi and Melamed, and in particular, the foundational distinction between property and liability
rules, has been accepted by virtually all the commentators.”); Smith, supra note 10, at 1720 n.1
(explaining that while Calabresi & Melamed also discussed inalienability rules, the article would focus
on their framework concerning property and liability rules).
104
And the authors characterized the few that were neither property rules or liability rules as
inalienability rules. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092−93.
105
Id. at 1092.
106
See id. at 1116 (describing the calculation of damages as difficult for courts to determine,
because often the injuries suffered are not easily measurable).
100
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assumptions, appears to be holdovers from a title-focused perspective.
Even as Calabresi and Melamed were describing the powerful
redefinitional effect of remedial choices, they were affirming that the
choice of remedies still must follow a determination of which party has the
entitlement. In these respects, their own assumptions narrowed the space
in which an outcome-focused approach could develop. The third
assumption underlying the authors’ framework is likely more attributable
to the authors’ apparent interest in tracking the economic consequences of
their framework rather than in tracking the development of the common
law.
The third assumption is the authors’ claim that, among the different
reasons for choosing entitlements, the primary reasons are economic
efficiency or distributional preferences.107 Here again, the authors’
categorization, though descriptive and capacious, is also quite
normative.108 As to this aspect of their framework, the authors have
received attention for failing to consider adequately the pluralistic values
that motivate individuals to seek outcomes or protect rights.109 While
Calabresi and Melamed focused on the distribution of wealth and “merit
good[s],”110 recent scholarship has elaborated substantially on other
important goals. For example, the broader notions of individual and
community economic development provide a palette of values underlying
the notion of fair distribution. These include concepts of human
capabilities and democratic ideals, among other important features.111
107
Id. at 1102. The authors mention a third category, “other justice reasons,” but “admit that it is
hard to know what content can be poured into that term, at least given the very broad definitions of
economic efficiency and distributional goals.” Id.
108
As with other aspects of their framework, the authors’ purportedly equal treatment of
efficiency and distributional issues has been overshadowed over time by a focus on the efficiency
considerations inherent in their framework. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 25
(“Calabresi and Melamed’s call to consider distributive and other justice considerations in determining
the allocation of entitlements has been all but ignored by subsequent law and economics scholars.
Although Calabresi and Melamed put the various considerations on equal footing, economic efficiency
somehow eclipsed the two other values.”).
109
See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and
Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 469 (1999) (“[Calabresi and
Melamed’s concept] does not describe any remedial regime that does or could exist under any legal
system . . . in which there are more than two parties.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1998) (discussing shortcomings of the
Calabresi and Melamed model).
110
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1098−101.
111
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 70−86 (2000) (arguing that human capabilities should help determine political ideals and
formulate the rights guaranteed to every citizen); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES
1−7 (1985) (describing how a person’s well-being is directly related to the fundamental concern of
economics, and one’s capabilities help assess this well-being); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 127, 134−38 (2009) (discussing
certain human capabilities, including life, freedom, practical reason, and affiliation); Joseph William
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Additional goals include cultural values and community norms about longterm land use, both of which inform our collective sense of fairness in
property relationships.
This Article adds modestly to these critiques by noting that the
primacy of economic efficiency in the authors’ model presumptively drives
the choice of remedies toward efficiency-focused entitlements. If reasons
for preferring entitlements were recognized as being more various and
pluralistic in nature, we might well expect that choices of outcomes would
reflect that variety. Thus, we might see less coalescence of property
bundles than we see where the most efficient outcome is presumed to be
the best outcome and, as the next Section discusses, where exclusive
ownership is presumed to be most efficient.
Consider the example of shared uses. Such uses are not just a matter
of most effectively internalizing the externalities of property ownership
and use; they also can increase the “size of the pie,” providing more
individuals with access to property for the purpose of productive use. A
failure to provide such access detracts from this goal. Moreover, the
exclusive nature of use in the ownership-dominated remedial framework
limits the extent to which cultural values associated with group-based
norms can be realized. The same could be said for long-term planning. In
short, the notion of use exclusivity renders social and cultural context
largely irrelevant, or at least only affirms dominant (rather than pluralistic)
values in this regard.
While Calabresi and Melamed’s particular view of the cathedral has
shaped an outcome-focused approach in meaningful ways, the more
significant effect of their framework is the extraordinary influence it has
had on property scholarship in that regard. In short, property scholars have
interpreted the binarisms within the framework, combined with the
emphasis on economic efficiency, to mean that entitlements that rise to the
level of ownership should be remedied with broad property rules. By this
interpretation, the limitations on ownership are enforced with narrow
exceptions to these rules. This is quite a significant extension of the
original framework, which claimed that property rules work best where
there are low transactions costs, while liability rules are more effective in
the presence of high transactions costs.112 The overlay that some scholars
add to Calabresi and Melamed’s original interpretation is that low
Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1009, 1045−46 (2009) (sympathizing with the approach to property that focuses on identifying
capabilities in the context of determining property rights).
112
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106–10. In exploring the connection between
entitlement and outcome, Calabresi and Melamed employed what appeared to be an elastic notion of an
entitlement that could easily accommodate rights to property that are less absolute than the full bundle
of rights idealized by Blackstone. For example, an entitlement could simply be to “make noise.” Id. at
1090.
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transaction costs exist where an exclusive notion of ownership can be
discerned in the name of one of the parties. It is thus only where exclusive
ownership is difficult to discern that liability rules or narrow exceptions to
broad property rules are more appropriate.
These extensions of Calabresi and Melamed’s original framework are
nowhere more evident than in Professor Henry Smith’s defense of property
rules.113 In his article, he undertakes to develop a theory of property rules
that “allow[s] an explanation of why property rules tend to be associated
with entitlements that we label ‘property,’”114 and concludes that such rules
often are paired with rights of exclusion,115 the “sine qua non” of property
ownership.116 As he states:
Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses
together and delegating to the owner the choice of how to use
the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any
stage. . . . On the duty holder side, the message is a simple
one—to “keep out.”117
Smith’s point is straightforward. Without the broad injunction (or property
rule) to “keep out,” the information costs associated with the exploitation
of resources would be too high.118 It would be unnecessarily costly for
those other than the owners themselves to identify appropriate uses of a
given resource and then to allocate those uses among different owners and
non-owners.119 Professor Smith reinforces this analysis by detailing the
connection between property rules and the in rem understanding of
property rights.120
By contrast, as Smith describes here and elsewhere, there are
categories of property disputes in which decision makers cannot avoid
more directly regulating “use conflict[s],”121 and it is largely on these
disputes that this Article concentrates. Smith describes such disputes as
falling within what he terms “governance regimes.”122 In these cases,
decision makers must “pick out more specific activities for

113

See generally Smith, supra note 10 (arguing that property rules have advantages over liability

rules).
114

Id. at 1723.
Id. at 1724; see also id. at 1754–74 (describing in great detail the necessary interrelatedness of
property rules and the right to exclude).
116
Merrill, supra note 10, at 730.
117
Smith, supra note 10, at 1728.
118
See id. at 1724–30 (“Property rules benefit from the savings in information costs that are made
possible by rights to exclude as opposed to more tailored use rights.”).
119
Id. at 1754–55, 1763–64.
120
Id. at 1724.
121
Id. at 1756.
122
Id. at 1751−53, 1757.
115
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123

measurement.”
Such governance regimes have long existed, often
having been used with respect to common resources, but they are also
evident in other core areas of the common law.124 In contrast to
“exclusion” regimes, where rights of use are bundled together under the
owner’s control without being individually delineated and regulated,
governance regimes directly manage specified uses.125
Professor Smith’s arguments about property rules fall within a broader
scholarly conversation that has emerged, arguing that the most accurate
legal description of property law is that it is about the right to exclude.126
Although this conversation may not always reference Calabresi and
Melamed’s cathedral framework, it does much to contribute to the equation
of entitlement with exclusive ownership in property law. In this view,
property rights ought to remain bundled wherever the potential for
reducing information costs exists.127
One of several problems with this perspective is that it preconceives a
conclusion that begins the analysis of any given property dispute by
considering the “right” of an owner to the “thing” owned.128 Such a
beginning point encourages decision makers to search for the “thing” and
then to label it as being absolutely owned by one of the parties. Professor
Merrill, Professor Smith, and other “exclusion scholars” who support this
view describe it as a more accurate description of how property law
operates in the real world. Parts III and IV of this Article dispute this
claim, at least in certain core areas of property law, one of which (trespass)
the exclusion scholars claim as falling within their regime. For now, it is
necessary to say only that the exclusion literature contributes further to a
particular interpretation of the cathedral framework in which entitlements
are bundled and broadly protected, leaving very little conceptual room for
sharing.
123
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S455 (2002). See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Governance
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 (2012) (drawing a distinction between exclusion property and
governance property and recognizing the importance of internal relationships among property owners).
124
Smith, supra note 123, at S455.
125
Smith, supra note 10, at 1755−56.
126
See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 10, at 72 (“The exclusion thesis is a statement of the driving
analysis of property in legal systems. It characterizes property primarily as a protected sphere of
indefinite and undefined activity, in which an owner may do anything with the things he owns.”);
Merrill, supra note 10, at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued
resource, . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have
property.”); see also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275, 275–77 (2008) (proposing that ownership is most concerned with the owner’s position as the
exclusive controller of her property).
127
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 31−34 (2000) (arguing that standardization of property rights will lower the
“external costs of measurement to third parties” such as information costs).
128
Smith, supra note 11, at 1691.
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The exclusion scholars are not the only ones who have contributed to
the conflation in property law of entitlement with ownership and property
rules with “keep out” orders. Professors Kaplow and Shavell arrive at a
similar, though more limited, extension of Calabresi and Malamed’s
original framework by concluding that property rules are appropriate to
remedy what they label “possessory interests,” which they equate with the
low transaction cost scenarios in which the original framework would tend
toward property rules.129 More limited examples such as this are still
important to include here because of the assumptions embedded in the
labels used. What exactly are possessory disputes? The answer may well
depend on whether a decision maker begins by defining rights or begins by
considering remedies. In sum, while the literature on Calabresi and
Melamed develops sophisticated interpretations and extensions of the
framework, a more basic theme that emerges is the drift from a broader
notion of entitlement that can be remedied by property or liability rules
depending on transaction costs to a narrower notion of bundled ownership
to be remedied by property rules.
Although it is by no means preordained, the prevailing understanding
of the bundle-of-rights view of property in some respects amplifies the
association between entitlement and ownership. The modern legal view is
that the use of land is something that can be independently owned; one can
be independently entitled to use land.130 Because use has become capable
of independent ownership and transfer, it has taken on the attributes of
ownership. Of particular interest here, the “right to use,” as in the case of
an easement, has assumed a mantle of exclusivity. It is a right that only the
owner may define, unless of course such a right is overridden by a new
prescriptive right or by condemnation.131 Thus, the owner of a “right to
use” has the right to determine who may use and, often, how much and for
how long. This is not to say that the bundle view of property is not also
129

Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 716.
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1597, 1606−09 (2008) (providing a brief overview of the forms of property contemplated by
American property law); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 688 (2008) (highlighting the independence of the
right to use from title to land by discussing the rent-seeking opportunities opened up to tenants,
servitude, holder, and others via exercise of the right not to use); see also Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive
Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47, 122 (1996) (discussing the bundle-of-rights conception of property
and arguing that the law currently views restrictions on the right to use (among other sticks in the
bundle) as prima facie injuries to an independent property right).
131
See Larissa Katz, A Powers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 687, 720−23 (2006) (pointing out that the exclusivity of the right to use also encompasses a
right to share); Katz, supra note 126, at 309 (stating that “[l]imits in property law on what qualifies as
an easement amount to exclusivity rules that preserve the supremacy of the owner’s position” to
determine the uses of the easement within its bounds).
130
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quite useful in considering the pragmatic possibility of an outcome-focused
approach. It is, however, to say that the bundle view has itself become
infused with basic assumptions about ownership that are not necessary to a
robust version of that view nor, more broadly, to sensible dispute
resolution.
C. Holmes: Outcome Before Ownership
The purpose of this Section is to present a theoretical conception of an
outcome-focused approach that is not saddled with the assumptions
embedded in Calabresi and Melamed’s framework (and its extended
versions as developed by other scholars). Most importantly, given my
claim that the binarisms in the framework limit the real world possibilities
for diverse outcomes, the objective here is to present a framework that
actually begins by considering outcomes before rights and that does not
presumptively categorize injunctions as broadly defined “property rules.”
Though rudimentary, the framework proposed by Holmes in his review of
the common law avoids both of these binarisms and thus, I argue, serves as
a more promising foundation for an efficacious outcome-focused approach
in modern property law that creates space for sharing. By not implicitly
favoring efficiency goals, Holmes’s framework also avoids the third
assumption that inheres in the cathedral framework. This Section
describes Holmes’s framework and its latent potential for property law.
Section II.D and Part III develop Holmes’s framework for modern
application.
Given his realist orientation, Holmes’s effort was to replace the
abstract morality that had infused the common law with an inquiry into
how individuals actually respond to legal rules.132 In The Path of the Law,
for example, Holmes attacked the notion that legal “rights” and “duties”
exist in any abstract, moral, or independent sense by making three basic
observations about them in operation. First, Holmes argued that legal
rights and duties are nothing but predictions “that if a man does or omits
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of
the court.”133 Second, he claimed that it is in this respect that legal rights
are different from moral rights, the latter of which may have meaning
independent of the extent to which they are enforced and the means of
enforcing them.134 Third, Holmes argued that it typically does not matter if
132
See Holmes, supra note 30, at 168–69 (claiming a confusion between law and morality and
proposing the idea that legal rights and duties are merely a system of predictions).
133
Id. at 169. Holmes put it even more strongly in his discussion of the common law of
possession: “A legal right is nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural powers, and upon
certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation by the aid of the public force.”
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 214.
134
Holmes, supra note 30, at 170–71.
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a legal duty is described in terms of “praise” or “blame” if the consequence
is the same.135 In this basic sense, the precise definition of the duty, for
example as a “fine[]” or a “tax[],”136 does not matter. Holmes concluded:
“You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at
the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and
expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of the
law.”137
In these observations, Holmes recognized that a more expansive
understanding of duties might exist in the case where courts grant
injunctions and enforce them by putting the defendant in prison or
“otherwise punishing him unless he complies with the order of the
court.”138 He emphasized that these circumstances ought to be the
exception from a general theory of the relationship between rights and
remedies rather than the rule.139
Nevertheless, given this Article’s focus on property law, the vagueness
of Holmes’s claims about injunctions is confusing until one observes the
same basic argument in his discussion of possession and ownership in
property law.140 In that discussion, Holmes emphasized that there was no
legal distinction between de facto possession and the legal right to
possess.141 More profoundly, he argued that the facts constituting
possession and those constituting ownership generate essentially the same
set of legal rights, though the latter are slightly more extensive than the
former.142 This was so because the remedies available to both the “mere”
possessor and the owner were largely the same.143 These observations are
a perhaps startling echo of the basic reality in the early system of writs for
real actions.144 What makes the comparison startling is that Holmes was
observing a reality in a system that purported to be so very engrossed with
the question of rights and duties.
As Holmes recognized, the assumed primacy of rights in legal thinking
made it difficult even to conceive of a world in which remedies could be
assigned without first resolving the question of whether one or another
135

Id. at 174.
Id. at 173.
137
Id. at 174.
138
Id. at 175–76.
139
Id. at 176.
140
See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 206–46 (analyzing possession as understood by the common
law and its relationship to ownership and title).
141
Id. at 238–39.
142
Id. at 239, 246. Holmes made the same point about the legal equivalence of different kinds of
contract, given the reality that enforcement could never include compelling performance to any extent
that could amount to servitude. Id. at 300.
143
See id. at 245–46 (enumerating the remedies available to both the owner and the possessor).
144
See supra Part II.A (discussing the predominant focus on outcomes in resolving legal disputes
in the early common law).
136
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145

party is entitled to a remedy.
The very dictates of logic seemed to
require that a remedy could only be available to one who is entitled to it.146
Thus the first hurdle to overcome in assessing the feasibility of an
outcome-first norm was a conceptual one: it required a replicable and
freestanding account of when a situation warrants a remedy. Here again,
Holmes provided the building blocks to overcome this hurdle.
On the basis of his observations about the primacy of remedy, Holmes
developed a prescription for the astute jurist—one who recognized that
legal rights exist and are defined only by and to the extent of their
enforcement.147 In essence, his prescription amounted to two questions
that he argued must always be asked about a dispute: “[F]irst, what are the
facts which make up the group in question; and then, what are the
consequences attached by the law to that group.”148 With respect to the
first question, Holmes emphasized the definition of a particular group by a
set of characteristics that warranted legal action. In his property example,
that of possession, these characteristics included “a certain physical
relation to [an] object and to the rest of the world” and “a certain intent.”149
Notably, these are not characteristics that necessarily define title, as
Holmes made clear when spinning out such scenarios as when a small
child and a ruthless robber share the same intent vis-à-vis a found object.150
Nevertheless, they are all that is required prior to answering the second
question, namely what remedies are available to the particular group
defined by these characteristics.151 It is, Holmes suggested, superfluous to
consider what right, if any, that group shares,152 though as a practical
matter it is probably more accurate to say that in Holmes’s world, the
outcome would define the right rather than render it irrelevant. The
allocation of remedy is based on a replicable set of facts which, when
present, should always warrant the same remedy. Holmes was able to
reduce the inquiry to just these two questions because of his equation of
“right” with “consequence.”153 Once a jurist recognized the basic
145
See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 30, at 174–75 (discussing the “mystic significance” that contract
law invests in “rights and duties”). Of course, many scholars have argued that it is only right to analyze
entitlements first. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1347 (1986) (“Conflating this distinction between right and remedy is commonplace
within the realist tradition that so dominates American Jurisprudence.”).
146
But see Holmes, supra note 30, at 184, 198 (emphasizing that normative considerations, what
he describes as questions of “social advantage,” ought to guide legal decisions rather than an abstract
sense of logic).
147
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 214–15; Holmes, supra note 30, at 184.
148
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215.
149
Id. at 216.
150
Id. at 235.
151
Id. at 215.
152
Id. at 214–15.
153
Id. at 214.
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irrelevance of rights independent of the remedy (or consequence) that
protected them, he or she was justified in avoiding an examination of the
“rights” of the parties as a separate inquiry (or, if you will, a third
question).154 This, of course, is in sharp contrast with the binary in the
cathedral framework in which a determination of the entitlement is still the
“first issue.”155 Here, Holmes dispensed with the question entirely, a move
which the model adapting his framework in Part III does not go so far as to
make. Also absent from the basic property examples that Holmes explored
is a predisposition toward broadly enjoining others from interfering with
property rights.
The outcome would depend on the surrounding
circumstances, whether involving age, infirmity, theft, temporary needs of
access or use, or myriad other criteria.
In short, what makes Holmes’s framework so refreshing is the
opportunity it presents to avoid designating “rights,” “owners,” and
“things” that fall within the value-laden category of “title” or “ownership”
before determining what about a given resource each party wants and
could have. At the level of theory, this would avoid a preoccupation with
what “progressive property” scholars sometimes refer to as the ownership
model of property and what exclusion scholars refer to as gate-keeping.
As Section II.D discusses, such a reorientation acknowledges that while
information costs might be reduced in an exclusion model of property law,
exclusion from packaged rights produces negative externalities and
transaction costs that a focus on outcomes could avoid. The key example
supporting this observation is that of sharing. In a world in which access
to resources is increasingly constricted to fewer owners, an exclusion
perspective on trespass law leaves many non-owners dependent on more
limited public resources when the alternative could have left non-owners
with limited opportunities to share private property.
And this possibility of property sharing, along with a greater openness
to diverse outcomes among owners and non-owners, is precisely the
greatest pragmatic potential of adapting Holmes’s framework. As Part III
will show, Holmes’s framework presents a means to produce actual
benefits from what property judges intuitively are drawn to do. It is a
means of acting upon judges’ intuitions where those intuitions reflect deep
experience with the needs of parties vis-à-vis limited resources. In this
respect, it is a theory that closely fits the reality of modern property
jurisprudence. As the case analyses below demonstrate, what was lost in
the progression from outcomes to entitlements and ultimately to bundled
ownership was the (perhaps largely inchoate) possibility of sharing in
154
See id. (“Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts which the law
defines, and whenever the law gives any one special rights not shared by the body of the people, it does
so on the ground that certain special facts, not true of the rest of the world, are true of him.”).
155
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090.
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ancient property law.
D. The Interest-Outcome Approach
The progression in the conceptualization of property interests from
writs to realists provides the foundation for a rich alternative to thinking
about property as a tightly bundled set of rights that justifies blunt
exclusion. This approach, which I label here as the interest-outcome
approach, captures important features of the different approaches
developed in each of these periods. From the medieval writ system, the
key feature that contributes to the interest-outcome approach is the notion
that possession and use are more salient interests to protect than a formal
designation of title. The medieval system embodied a second dichotomy,
that of outcome versus right or title. By rewarding possession, the system
implicitly prioritized outcome over formal title. The legal realists, from
Holmes and Llewelyn to Calabresi, seized upon this second dichotomy as a
way of understanding the scope, value, and extent of rights. Holmes
stretched it so far as to present a basic jurisprudential preference for
remedy over right, where the imperative to remedy could be ascertained by
determining need rather than right.156 Property theorists who have
explored the cathedral more recently have labeled the dichotomy
somewhat differently, adding their own layers of meaning to it. Thus,
Smith has emphasized that the choice is really between governance
regimes focusing on use on the one hand and title-centered regimes
focusing on exclusion on the other.157
As Part III will discuss in detail, the different dichotomies represented
in these approaches are supplemented by the business of judging, a
business that was iconically captured by Carol Rose’s description of the
judicial muddying of crystalline rules.158 This classic process of layering
exceptions to prevent unfairness began in the Fourteenth Century by, for
example, the addition of injunctive relief as a remedy for a person bringing
a claim of disseisin.159 As Professor Singer has described, the basic
dichotomy between equity and law continues to animate decisions in
property cases.160 We also see a version of this dichotomy in judicially
created exceptions based on the particular facts of a case despite the

156
See supra Part II.C (presenting Holmes’s theoretical framework, which considers the outcomes
of property disputes before rights and emphasizing Holmes’s focus on remedies).
157
Smith, supra note 123, at S453, S455.
158
Rose, supra note 65, at 578–80.
159
See Donahue, supra note 70, at 954–57 (recounting the establishment of courts of equity
during the fourteenth century).
160
See SINGER, supra note 29, at 98–105 (presenting the interplay between law and equity and the
importance of both in cases involving property).
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apparent applicability of one or more clear rules.
We see another
version in judicial and scholarly claims that the morality of a given
situation dictates a certain result in support of,162 or even in the face of,163
clear-cut rules.
The interest-outcome approach is a means of resolving property
disputes where more than one legitimate interest exists concerning use,
possession, or access to a piece of property and where such interests are
represented in the form of conflicting positions concerning the property. In
such a situation, Professor Smith’s recommendation of an exclusion regime
with bundled title would not be of much use in recognizing and resolving
legitimate interests on both sides of a dispute. Someone would have to
lose in Smith’s world, and unnecessarily so.164 Instead, the interestoutcome approach would begin the process of dispute resolution by having
the court recognize and define the legitimate interests on both sides of a
dispute. This would decidedly not be a process of searching out who has
formal title. Rather, the task would be to determine each party’s interests
vis-à-vis the property. The heart of the interest-outcome approach would
be the second step, which would require the court to consider outcomes
that could best accommodate each party’s legitimate interests. It would
only be at the third and final step that formal title, and entitlements more
broadly defined, would come back into the picture, requiring the court to
consider the extent to which they are relevant to a given dispute.
While resonating with each of the dichotomies described above, the
interest-outcome approach draws its main inspiration from negotiation
theory, which—at its core—protects interests over positions. As Professor
Robert Mnookin and his coauthors argued in Beyond Winning, by
concentrating on interests, the parties in a given conflict can negotiate to
create value in a given dispute.165 The present Article applies that core
insight to property law by arguing that in many disputes, formal title is the
equivalent to the starting positions that parties take in a dispute, which if
pursued doggedly would result in one party winning everything and the
161

Id.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 10, at 1850 (arguing that property rights cannot exist unless a
moral significance is attached to property ownership).
163
See, e.g., Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 157, 207 (1994)
(identifying that a new type of equitable property will develop in order to supplement rules of law);
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–64 (2009) (asserting that a more
normative theory of property would allow purely economic analysis to be situated within a moral
framework).
164
In this respect, the interest-outcome model resonates with the “split-the-difference” outcomes
favored by Professors Parchomovsky, Siegelman, and Thel, in their discussion of windfalls, see Gideon
Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Rights and Half Wrongs, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 757–62 (2007), but
this Article advocates for such outcomes in a much broader range of disputes.
165
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DISPUTES 35–37 (2000).
162
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other losing.
By contrast, if the court and parties focus on the parties’
legitimate interests, they can more easily innovate outcomes that protect a
broader range of those legitimate interests.167
The negotiation-grounded focus of the interest-outcome approach thus
emphasizes outcome far more than title. As in the many examples
provided by Mnookin and his coauthors, when the dispute resolution
process begins by focusing on the interests “at the table,” the main focus of
the process is in fact on the outcomes—or “trades”—that could be used to
protect those interests.168 This approach also recognizes the importance of
use and possession over and, at times, in lieu of formal title, because use
and possession are often legitimate interests that can serve as the basis for
finding more equitable outcomes or trades. Similarly, a focus on interests
picks up on Holmes and other legal realists’ attention to the parties’ needs
rather than simply to their rights.169
Comparing this approach to more contemporary views of the cathedral,
this Article endorses and provides further support for Gregory Alexander’s
and Joseph Singer’s arguments that many more property disputes are about
governance than Professor Smith might believe.170 Thus, certainly in the
contexts where the interest-outcome approach would most naturally apply
(but quite possibly in the vast majority of property disputes), use must be
evaluated for the purpose of determining who has been harmed, how much,
and in what respect. Indeed, in his analysis of the circumstances in which,
counter-intuitively, the delineation of uses can be the lowest-cost method
for resolving disputes, Professor Smith also presents a response to those
who would argue that this model is too costly to take seriously. Where this
is the case, the evaluation of use for remedial purposes likely adds no cost
at all.171 In addition to disagreement concerning the ubiquity of
governance regimes, this Article also disputes Professor Smith’s views on
remedies. Smith proposes that remedies in “governance” disputes should
center on liability rules.172 By contrast, this Article argues that the
outcome-centered analysis required by the interest-outcome approach
should normatively lead to a broad array of outcomes, involving both
damages and injunctions.
The vision of property disputes presented in this Article also adds a
166

Id. at 24, 125–26.
Id. at 35–37.
168
See, e.g., id. at 227 box 17 (comparing the net-expected-outcome approach to the interestbased approach to negotiation).
169
See supra Part II.C (discussing the outcome-based approach of Holmes).
170
Alexander, supra note 123, at 1858, 1860; see also Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason
in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1375, 1380 (2013) (illustrating the ways in which
standards and governance are essential to the system of property rights).
171
Smith, supra note 10, at 1757–58.
172
Id. at 1751–52.
167
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perspective on the dichotomies that judges experience in the course of
judging. It is true that focusing on legitimate interests, or justified
expectations (as Professor Singer advocates),173 will muddy crystalline
rules that prioritize formal title and exclusion. A focus on such things as
outcomes and reliance interests also could add mud.174 Judicial analysis
under this approach will look more like that seen in traditional courts of
equity than of law, centering on detailed inquiries into the particular facts
(interests) and even the moral positions of the parties in given cases. But
the interest-outcome approach does nothing to add to the fact that mud
would inevitably result in such difficult cases. The question of how many
disputes are ultimately muddy is a descriptive one that can be answered by
empirical research. The question that the interest-outcome approach
addresses is where in the dispute the muddying should occur—whether in
defining entitlements or rights or in defining outcomes. This Article
argues that by spending time on examining outcomes, judges using the
interest-outcome approach will more easily be able to imagine and
innovate a range of outcomes that will protect more of the legitimate
interests of parties in any given dispute.
The theoretical groundings for the interest-outcome approach also
inspire a basic definition for “sharing” as this Article uses that term. The
most important feature of sharing under the interest-outcome approach is
that it results in outcomes that represent compromises of some sort
between the parties’ varying interests. Thus, under this approach, the
opposite of sharing is the kind of all-or-nothing outcomes for which
litigating parties typically advocate in their pleadings. Instead, sharing
would be accomplished by court-imposed or settled outcomes that give
each party something—but not everything.175 Whose interests and
judgments would define whether sharing has resulted? The answer would
necessarily be that each party’s interests and judgments would be relevant
to that question. Under this definition, some types of sharing would be at
173
See SINGER, supra note 29, at 212 (stating that the norm of justified expectations “invites
critical inquiry into when expectations are justified, . . . from the standpoint of justice and from that of
utility” and “invites conversation about the circumstances under which it is fair to impose obligations
on individuals to respect the interests and property rights of others”).
174
See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 663–701
(1988) (discussing the relevance of social relations in determining interests in property and arguing that
such relations have been marginalized by the free market model). While the interest-outcome model
pays close attention to reliance interests, the expansive understanding of “legitimate interests” in my
model incorporates prospective uses as well. Id. at 679–92.
175
The model’s theoretical connection to standards, as distinguished from rules, is particularly
relevant here, given the literature on bargaining in the shadow of vague standards. See, e.g., Ian Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 137–38
(1999); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256
(1995); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
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the core of the interest-outcome model. These would include uses of
property that are simultaneous or perhaps even require ongoing
collaboration or coordination. But by requiring transfers of property and
other forms of sharing over time, the model also encompasses sharing that
does not require an ongoing relationship. In these latter examples of
sharing, arguably the most important contribution of this model is at the
conceptual level: the model creates space for courts and individuals to
think about property through the lens of sharing rather than through the
lens of exclusivity.
While the primary support for this model is in its application, as Part
III will demonstrate, it is already possible at this stage of the analysis to
call attention to some of the theoretical and practical implications of the
interest-outcome approach.
1. Theoretical Implications
First, the interest-outcome approach to resolving property disputes
lends additional validation to the bundle of rights conception of property
law that became increasingly well-received during the twentieth century.176
The bundle conception regards property as comprising a number of
entitlements, not just one monolithic entitlement denoted by the term
“ownership.” According to such a conception, it is entirely possible to
distribute rights within the bundle to different people. For example,
implied easements cases embody the bundle conception by distributing the
right to use to one party, while reserving ownership of the underlying land
to another.177
Though the bundle conception has been the subject of recent
criticism,178 the implied easements cases provide some evidence that this
conception is quite richly descriptive of core types of property disputes. In
such cases, rights to exclude are not nearly as relevant to dispute resolution
as the ability to distribute limited aspects of property “ownership” to more
than one party. Aside from adding evidence that courts lean toward this
type of unbundling all the time and in the context of deploying a variety of
doctrines, the interest-outcome model demonstrates that the ability to
develop more meaningful outcomes in property cases is greatly enhanced
by a perspective that views property as multi-stranded, rather than
monolithic, and pluralistic, rather than monistic.179
Indeed, another way to advance the abstract claim of this Article is to
176

Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 195

(2011).
177
See Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809–10 (1906) (providing an example of an implied
easement, where the court found the defendant had the right to enter the plaintiff’s land to maintain an
irrigation ditch that served the defendant’s property).
178
Klein & Robinson, supra note 176, at 195–96 (2011).
179
Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 25–26, 29 (2011).
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argue that property law currently embodies too narrow a view of property
entitlements. And, in fact, this is a predominant theme in an important
cross-section of current property law scholarship.180 The argument here is
that property law would benefit from a more varied and broader
understanding of entitlements,181 one that incorporates, for example,
obligation as well as right.182 As will be clear in Part III, the interestoutcome approach incorporates this broader understanding of entitlement,
as distinguished from the conflation of entitlement with title by some of the
cathedral literature, and also as distinguished from Calabresi and
Melamed’s original use of entitlement which, though broader than simply
title, was still efficiency-focused.
A second observation about ownership viewed from an interestoutcome perspective is that it is much less integral to resolving these cases
than many property lawyers might presume. In contrast to the cathedral
framework, in the Holmesian conception of outcome first, the particular
rights in the bundle truly are derivative of the outcomes. At times,
decision makers may not really know what will happen with those rights,
to whom they will be distributed, and to what extent, until after they
determine basic outcomes. Yet, as application of the model to a range of
property doctrines will demonstrate, disputes are quite capable of
resolution without starting with a determination of who owns what. These
two lessons about ownership add meaningfully to our contemporary
understanding about the instrumental role of ownership in property law.
Stripped of its moral force, ownership accomplishes less than we may
assume.
2. Potential Costs
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the model is the claim that it would
create uncertainty about property rights, which would translate into
uncertainty in market transactions. The uncertainty could result from
indeterminacy about legal claims and entitlements, since the initial focus
under this model would be on interests and outcomes. It could also result
from consideration of the needs of non-parties. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, it could result in ad hoc decisionmaking that would lead to
unpredictability in the determination of rights over key resources. Under
this scenario, the result would be less efficient market transactions, a
180

See generally SINGER, supra note 29.
Another intriguing example of the differences that could flow from a broader understanding of
entitlements is the approach suggested by Professor James Smith in his development of a “law of
neighbors.” See James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 757, 762–63, 785 (2011) (proposing a “friend model” that recognizes special rights
and obligations of neighbors).
182
See Alexander, supra note 11, at 774–75, 778–79 (suggesting an alternative understanding of
ownership that includes “an aspect of the social obligation inherent in private ownership”).
181
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conclusion that challengers might draw on the basis of empirical research
on tragedies of the commons.183
The most effective response to this challenge would be to use it as a
basis for carefully defining the scope of the model. Most importantly, the
model is not intended to eliminate claims and entitlements in property law.
The model would still operate in a context in which one or more parties
filed suit against one or more defendants on the basis of one or more legal
causes of action. These claims would be the basis for a determination
about whether it was even appropriate in the lawsuit to begin with a
consideration of appropriate remedies. In some lawsuits involving adverse
possession, trespass, implied easement, and nuisance, the answer could
well be yes. In many others falling outside of contexts typically regulated
by Professor Smith’s “governance regimes,” the answer would very often
be no.184 This traditional means of filing suit would also cabin the extent
to which non-parties to the lawsuit could influence the development of
remedies.
A second response to the challenge of market uncertainty is, of course,
that enormous uncertainties already exist in the key doctrinal areas in
which the model is proposed as an alternative. These uncertainties are
often a direct result of the “muddying” of property rights in an effort to
accomplish more equitable distributive results. For example, the nuisance
claim depends on a highly fact-specific balancing test of five or more
factors.185 Similarly, implied easements are notoriously muddy, confusing,
and inconsistent.186 These are not areas in which bright lines determine
legal rights. To the contrary, the very question of ownership depends on
nuanced questions of intent, reliance, and expectation. If anything, an
183
See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Common Property, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 317–23 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing the problems of common
property as a common pool resource, including the fall of resource values because of limited exchange
and ineffective allocation of common-property resources); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968) (“Freedom in a commons [will result in] ruin to all.”);
Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 339–40 (1985)
(“[S]uch a legal doctrine would assign rights to an open class and, of course, destroy alienability.”).
184
See Smith, supra note 123, at S453, S455 (defining “governance rules” as those that “pick out
uses and users in more detail, imposing a more intense informational burden on a smaller audience of
duty holders”).
185
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 378 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the numerous
factors courts must look at when evaluating the gravity of harm in a nuisance claim).
186
See Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation
Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988) (summarizing the
feelings of some of those familiar with the law of servitudes by stating, “Others have described it more
colorfully ‘as an unspeakable quagmire,’ . . . and an area of the law full of ‘rigid categories, silly
distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values’” (quoting E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 480 (2d ed. 1982), and C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW
909 (2d ed. 1985))).
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interest-outcome approach could leave ownership itself more clear.
Professors Alexander and Peñalver have provided a third response in
their review of New Jersey case law on trespass, a jurisprudence that
proponents of a more monolithic theory of ownership might criticize for its
“ad hoc-ery.” As they demonstrate, predictability has developed relatively
quickly and uncomplicatedly in this jurisprudence.187 There is no reason to
think that the same could not be expected of the interest-outcome model
proposed here. The proposed model has no more criteria for evaluation
than those encountered by courts in nuisance cases; nor are the criteria any
more nebulous than the reasonableness standard and similar touchstones.
(Indeed, they are probably far less so.) Moreover, there is no reason to
think that such an approach would not be capable of ripening into
legislation over time.188
A second, and somewhat related, challenge to the model is that it
would go too far in the direction of redistribution, particularly to the extent
that remedies could be based more on prospective uses than on reliance
interests.189 Here again, the most effective response would be to clarify the
extent to which future uses would be affirmed in remedial grants. The
model is decidedly not arguing in favor of granting remedies on the basis
of completely prospective uses. In such circumstances, the potential claim
or counterclaim would be so abstract as to make a remedy virtually
impossible to grant. Rather, the relevance of future uses is more in the
crafting of the scope of remedy than in the decision about whether to grant
one in the first place. The point of considering future uses is to garner the
most benefit from use as a remedial tool, but not to incorporate prospective
behavior as a basis for determining need. This is a critical basis for
distinguishing this model from overtly redistributive schemes.
III. THE IMPULSE TO SHARE IN MODERN PRACTICE
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that, in core areas of
property law, judges are drawn to sharing. For example, in nuisance cases,
judges rely on balancing tests to acknowledge that both parties have
rights.190 In adverse possession cases and implied easements, judges
187
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
THEORY 141–42, fig.7.1 (2012).
188
Id. at 140.
189
Cf. Singer, supra note 174, at 679, 692 (discussing instances in which property rights are
redistributed from the owner to the non-owner thereby protecting the legitimate interests of the more
vulnerable party in relying on access to certain resources and the relationships that such access makes
possible).
190
See, e.g., Page Cnty. Appliance Ctr. v. Honeywell, 347 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1984)
(recognizing that in nuisance claims “[o]ne’s use of property should not unreasonably interfere with or
disturb a neighbor’s comfortable and reasonable use and enjoyment of his or her estate” and that “[a]
fair test of whether the operation of lawful trade or industry constitute a nuisance is the reasonableness
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evaluate the uses made by parties, and on that basis, they recognize
rights.191 Even in trespass cases, judges create exceptions to the absolute
right to exclude.192 The core insight from this analysis is that judges often
lean toward exactly what this Article claims as the core benefit of a
Holmesian approach to dispute resolution.
However, because these same judges operate in a title-focused system,
they tend not to act on their instinct toward sharing other than by
recognizing relatively metaphysical “rights” to share. Were they to begin
with the question of interests and outcomes, these judges could actualize
their intuitions by granting parties the core benefit of property sharing.
Instead, at the point of granting remedies, they default to a more
formalistic affirmation of bundled ownership. In nuisance, that remedial
turn to formalism takes the form of damages for plaintiffs (rather than
property sharing) where the defendants’ uses are socially beneficial. In
adverse possession, the remedy is a blunt injunction recognizing complete
ownership in the adverse possessor. By allocating rights to use, remedies
in cases recognizing implied easements are the most reflective of the
sharing impulse. But as this Part shows, they still formalistically bundle
such use rights into a form of limited ownership.
A. Nuisance (and Negative Easements)
In the late 1970s, Glenn Prah built a house that reflected the national
energy consumption crisis by incorporating solar panels on the roof.193
The panels collected enough energy to provide heat and hot water to Prah’s
house.194 Prah’s was one of the first houses in a subdivision, the zoning for
which at the time did not appear to contemplate the shadowing and other
effects that improvements on individual lots might have on the solar panel
systems on other houses in the subdivision.195 Some time later, Richard
Maretti bought the lot next door to Prah’s lot and planned to build a house
of conducting it in the manner, at the place, and under the circumstances shown by the evidence”).
191
See, e.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ill. 1987) (stating that
in implied easements cases “courts find particular facts suggestive of intent on the part of the parties”
and that “proof of the prior use is evidence that the parties probably intended an easement, on the
presumption that the grantor and the grantee would have intended to continue an important or necessary
use of the land known to them that was apparently continuous and permanent in its nature”).
192
See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971) (providing an example of an
exception to the absolute right to exclude, and explaining that “the ownership of real property does not
include the right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers” before finding
that “there was no trespass”). While this Part focuses largely on doctrines described by Professor
Smith as falling within governance regimes, it makes the same observations about the law of trespass,
which exclusion theorists hold up as a paradigmatic example of the value of exclusion theory in
explaining the real world.
193
Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Wis. 1982).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 198–99 (Callow, J., dissenting).
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on it. When Prah learned of Maretti’s plans, he informed Maretti that his
proposed construction would cause a shadow to fall across Prah’s solar
panels, possibly compromising his heating system.196 The solution,
according to Prah, was for Maretti to move his house a few feet back from
its proposed location.197 Maretti refused to change his plans to respond to
Prah’s concerns, and he began construction.198 Both parties’ improvements
complied with local zoning and building requirements.199
Prah sued Maretti on three grounds,200 two of which are relevant to this
discussion. Aside from a statutory claim, he claimed that Maretti’s
construction constituted a private nuisance and also that he had acquired a
solar easement by prior appropriation over Maretti’s property.201 In the
face of a zealous dissent arguing (with good reason) that the building of an
ordinary single family home could not constitute a private nuisance,202 the
majority held that Prah had stated a claim for private nuisance under which
relief could be granted.203 In so doing, the majority relied on a number of
sources of law, none of which were binding on the court.204 These
included the English common law doctrines recognizing express easements
as well as negative prescriptive easements to receive sunlight (the so-called
doctrine of “ancient lights”),205 spite fence laws prohibiting neighbors from
blocking each other’s light out of spite,206 and a Wisconsin case adopting
the reasonable use rule with respect to surface water.207
Primarily, however, the court relied on three policy reasons that in
large measure embody the prescriptive model advocated for in this Article.
First, the court found that use of property is increasingly regulated for the
benefit of the “general welfare.”208 Second, the court recognized that
Prah’s use of sunlight as energy was part of a new social and economic
trend that contributed to economic development and welfare.209 Finally,
the court balanced such a use against the competing use of land for
unrestricted development.210
Although Prah does not represent the majority rule on the question of
196

Id. at 184 (majority opinion).
Id. at 185.
198
Id. at 184.
199
Id. at 184–85.
200
Id. at 186.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 196–97 (Callow, J., dissenting).
203
Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
204
Id. at 187–89.
205
Id. at 188.
206
Id. at 188–89.
207
Id. at 190 (citing State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974)).
208
Id. at 189.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 189–90.
197
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whether people can have rights to light and air beyond the boundaries of
their own land,211 it is fairly typical of nuisance cases in one key respect.
In Prah, as in so many nuisance cases, the court recognized, affirmed, and
even produced shared rights.212 In this core area of property law, the
instinct exists among decision makers to recognize more than one party’s
interests to the same parcel of land. Perhaps this is so because courts view
these cases as involving two landowners with conflicting rights.213 Perhaps
also the pull toward sharing is easier in the overlapping space between torts
and property, represented by the factors listed in the Restatement of Torts
for consideration in balancing harm against utility of conduct claimed to be
a nuisance.214 By relying on a broadly inclusive balancing test, nuisance
claims seem more adaptable to an interest-outcome approach than much of
property law.
For example, by focusing on Prah’s limited interest in sharing
Maretti’s property, the court recognized Prah’s reliance on access to
sunlight.215 It explicitly contemplated the national context in which the use
of alternative energy sources was becoming increasingly imperative.216 In
so doing, the court gave more opportunity, for longer-term considerations
of planning and coordination.217 By balancing these considerations, the
211
See SINGER, supra note 185, at 409 (“The vast majority of courts in the United States would
hold that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, owners have absolute rights to develop their
property without liability for any interference with their neighbor’s interests in light and air.”).
212
See, e.g., Osborne v. Power, 908 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ark. 1995) (enforcing an injunction against
homeowners enjoining them from placing massive Christmas light displays on their property); Locklin
v. Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 756 (Cal. 1994) (affirming judgment for plaintiff property owners for
damage to their creek side properties through storm water runoff, entering judgment against city,
county, flood control district, and other public entities); Westland Skating Ctr., Inc. v. Gus Machado
Buick, Inc., 542 So. 2d 959, 964 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that damage caused by interference with
surface waters flowing from improved property can constitute a legal claim for which relief can be
granted); Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1080 (La. 1985) (granting a neighbor’s injunction
that enjoined a homeowner from operating a display consisting of lights and music during the
Christmas season); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956) (affirming a judgment
requiring a contractor to complete drainage piping to prevent further water damage to a landowner’s
property); Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, 523 (Va. 2007) (holding that encroaching trees and
plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of
actual harm to adjoin property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979) (stating
that “an intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable
if . . . the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actors conduct” which recognizes the shared
rights of the land owner as well the rights of a person invading that land).
213
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996). We will,
however, see this in doctrines resolving conflicts between claimants to a single parcel too.
214
When considering the gravity of the harm, these factors include the social value of the use
invaded and the suitability of such use to the character of the locality. Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 192 n.16.
215
Id. at 191.
216
Id. at 189.
217
Indeed, all three of the policy reasons presented by the court, especially when taken together,
reflect such an interest. See id. at 190 (“The law of private nuisance is better suited to resolve land
owners’ disputes about property development . . . .”).

2013]

SHARING THE CATHEDRAL

687

court effectively balanced individual economic considerations, including
the marketability of each party’s property, with and against broader
societal concerns. Moreover, the court’s analysis was forward-looking,
considering the harms that could result from a failure of Prah’s solar
energy system and the benefits that could accrue from his future use of that
system.218
Of course, this instinct in favor of sharing can only go so far in
mainstream nuisance law. This is most easily demonstrated by considering
the question of doctrinal plausibility: as the dissent points out, it is difficult
to swallow the claim that the construction of a single-family house could
be a nuisance.219 This complication and the difficulty of providing
adequate notice to those who may interfere with access to light are the two
primary reasons why the majority of jurisdictions refuse to recognize rights
to light and air.220
But although courts produce shared rights quite regularly in these
cases, at the point of allocating remedies, courts disrupt the natural
repercussions of these shared rights by formalistically affirming a more
bundled notion of ownership. Ironically enough, while rights are relatively
less hard-edged in nuisance law, resulting in more rhetorical and doctrinal
recognition of the need for accommodation among “neighbors,” courts
effectively snap back to attention and formalistically affirm ownership as
the ultimate right at the remedial stage. In nuisance cases, this particular
remedial turn takes the form of a grant of damages where the “socially
beneficial” nature of the defendant’s ownership warrants protecting its
bundled form.221 The preference for damages in cases such as this exalts
bundled ownership by limiting the extent to which parties can, practically
speaking, share property. It may be the case that both parties have “rights”
to a given property, but if a party receives damages in recognition of its
rights, that party’s ability to use, transfer, and access the property will be
nonexistent. By contrast, an interest-outcome approach would make clear
whether damages would be of any real value to the plaintiff.
The facts of the Prah case provide an archetypical template for such a
move. Given the veneration of the single-family home in American law,222
218
The same considerations ought to come into play in cases dealing with other doctrines. See,
e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 164–66 (Wis. 1997) (explaining that the
inquiry into trespass ought to have considered the cost and danger of using the icy road that was
available for transporting a mobile home).
219
Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 196–197 (Callow, J., dissenting).
220
SINGER, supra note 185, at 409–11.
221
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979) (acknowledging the possibility of
damages as compensation for nuisance).
222
See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189–90 (2009) (noting that “[h]ome ownership is part of the
American dream because of the economic security it gives homeowners” and that being a homeowner
carries “culturally significant status”); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status:
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it would be reasonable to expect courts adopting Prah’s holding to find
conduct like Maretti’s to be socially beneficial. Such a conclusion would
confound the multi-textured use analysis undertaken by the majority
opinion in determining the question of appropriate use in the first place.
Indeed, Calabresi and Melamed’s central point is particularly apt in a case
like Prah. The distributive effect of damages in place of injunctive relief
would be quite significant. What use would money damages really be to
Prah if Maretti could go on building, thereby effectively destroying the
function and value of Prah’s energy system? Perhaps even more
importantly, how would such an outcome uphold the broader social
concerns raised by the Court?
The challenge in cases such as Prah is to find a basis for balancing
outcomes without being bound by some of the constraints of nuisance
doctrine. For example, in a nuisance case, the question of what uses may
occur on a particular parcel is initially answered by who owns it.223 It is
not typical for a plaintiff claiming a nuisance to receive a remedy allowing
the plaintiff access to the defendant’s property for the purposes of
monitoring the defendant’s use or sharing in certain types of use. Rather,
the contest is viewed as one between two landowners with conflicting
interests about freedom versus security, in which each cannot access or use
the other’s property.224
B. Adverse Possession, Trespass, and Implied Easements
1. Adverse Possession
Contrast with nuisance the doctrine of adverse possession, first in its
atypical application in a case where a formalist recognition of ownership
runs amuck, and then in its more typical manifestation, where ownership
still results in a formalistic divestment of one party’s property interests in
favor of bundling ownership in the other. Briefly stated, by focusing on
property use, adverse possession doctrine provides a rich doctrinal
mechanism to promote sharing. However, in current adverse possession
doctrine, that potential is utterly inchoate because, at the remedial stage,
courts do the opposite of creating opportunities to share and instead grant
fully bundled ownership to either the true owner or the adverse
possessor.225
First, the atypical case: In 1982, Elizabeth and Mark Whitcombe took
The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
952–53 (2008) (noting that homeowners are “currently privileged within our society” and are “afforded
both significant monetary benefits and social capital”).
223
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822; 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 64.02[3][a] (2011).
224
SINGER, supra note 29, at 36.
225
SINGER, supra note 185, at 281.
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up residence at 98 Ditmars Street, a single family house in the City Island
area of the Bronx.226 At the time they moved in, the house was “empty and
overgrown and [the Whitcombes] believed it to be abandoned.”227 The
Whitcombes were artists at the time, and they had a child.228 By their own
account, having just had difficulties with their landlord, they felt
“desperation” in their need to find housing.229 Upon moving into the
house, the Whitcombes cleaned, repaired, and added “improvements” to
the exterior and the surrounding lot; acquired telephone and electric
services in their name; and directed their mail to that address.230 They also
set up an artists’ studio in the house and put a sign in the front yard
advertising their art.231 The Whitcombes lived in and maintained the house
for almost twenty years.232 In short, they made physical use of the property
like any long-term homeowner.
In 1998, Crystal Waterview Corporation bought the property in a
mortgage foreclosure action, and in 1999, it sold the property to Haim
Joseph.233 Joseph filed an action for ejectment, and the Whitcombes
counterclaimed that they had acquired ownership of the property by
adverse possession.234 When asked why they had moved into a house they
knew was not theirs, Mark Whitcombe answered that he had assumed the
house was abandoned because it was in a floodplain and very difficult to
“reclaim” and maintain.235
On appeal, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and rejected the Whitcombes’ claim of adverse possession.236
The court held that, despite engaging in “open conduct consistent with
ownership,”237 the Whitcombes did not enter the property under “claim of
right,” but rather as mere “licensees.”238 In making use of the property,
according to the court, there was nothing more that the Whitcombes ought
to have done.239 The problem was with their expectation of ownership. As
the court expressed a number of times, because they were mere
226

Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. They did not, however, pay taxes on the property. Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 45–46.
236
Id. at 48.
237
Id. at 46.
238
Id. at 47.
239
See id. (“The present case, in which an urban lot, improved by a residential dwelling in a
community occupied by a population that seems to be more settled than transient, and where people
tend to know who owns what property, is unusual in that defendants managed to live, rent free, as long
as they had in the subject dwelling.”).
227
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“squatters,”
they possessed no legitimate expectation of lawful
“possession” when they entered the property, and their use of the property
thus never “ripen[ed]” into a claim of right.241
The Joseph case is exceptional in the law of adverse possession for
making an issue out of the concept of “claim of right,” a requirement in
adverse possession doctrine that is quite underdeveloped, if not even pro
forma.242 Subsequent commentary on the case suggests that the court
invoked this rather empty concept for the purpose of dealing expansively
with the growing concern over squatters in New York City.243 More
importantly for the purposes of this Article, the case is also exceptional in
adverse possession jurisprudence because it exalts a formalistic notion of
ownership—while using a doctrine known for undermining at least some
aspects of formalism—in favor of recognizing ownership on the basis of
use and reliance. Contrary to the vast majority of adverse possession case
law, which finds a claim of right on the basis of treatment of the property
as an ordinary owner would,244 Joseph held that even when someone uses
the property extensively over a long period of time and in a manner that is
typically privileged as appropriate use, a more formal and subjective
concept of ownership takes priority over such use.245
In this respect, Joseph is an exaggerated, almost unfair, example of the
problem identified in this Article. To the extent that adverse possession is
the best (if still imperfect) example of use as a remedial force, Joseph is a
dramatic case for demonstrating how the bundled view of ownership can
cause mischief. Joseph and indeed many adverse possession cases are
excellent candidates for remedies involving sharing because conflicting use
interests are often absent. As in Joseph, the true owner is often physically
240

Id. at 46–48. The court used the term “squatter” seven times in the opinion. Id.
Id. at 47.
242
See SINGER, supra note 185, at 299 (stating that the majority of states collapse the “claim of
right” element into the adversity element, simply requiring that adverse possessors act toward the
property “as an average owner would act” while a small number of states impose a test requiring that
the adverse possessor intentionally dispossess the record owner).
243
See Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 703, 720 (2001) (noting the
anomalous nature of the Joseph court’s focus on squatters and opining that this may be due to a judicial
hostility toward “wrongdoer[s],” which “may be reinforced when the property is urban rather than rural
land, as the First Department explicitly acknowledged in Joseph”).
244
See, e.g., Bearden v. Ellison, 560 So. 2d 1042, 1044–45 (Ala. 1990) (“An adverse possessor
need only use the land ‘in a manner consistent with its nature and character—by such acts as would
ordinarily be performed by the true owners of such land in such condition.’” (quoting Hand v. Stanard,
392 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Ala. 1980))); Almond v. Anderegg, 557 P.2d 220, 223 (Or. 1976) (“Under our
decisions plaintiff must show that she occupied or used the land as would the ordinary owner of the
same type of land, taking into account the uses for which the land was suitable.”); Burkhardt v. Smith,
115 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Wis. 1962) (“Actual occupancy means the ordinary use to which the land is
capable and such as an owner would make of it.”).
245
See Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (holding the defendants’ long-term use of the property did not
ripen into a claim of right).
241
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absent from the property and may well be interested instead in using it
for purposes of investment or future transfer. Thus, cases like Joseph have
the potential for allowing so-called squatters to improve abandoned
properties and produce other benefits, both private and social, from their
uses.247 But the remedies in such cases fail to recognize that potential.
Joseph aside, the more standard adverse possession doctrine is a
convenient illustration of this point and more broadly of the same doubleminded response to conflicting interests to property that is apparent in
nuisance doctrine. In the more typical adverse possession cases, courts
flirt with the possibility of sharing by investigating the uses made by the
non-owning adverse possessor.248 These analyses serve the important
purpose of demonstrating that use of property can have major distributive
consequences. Moreover, given its long and successful history in
American jurisprudence, adverse possession doctrine proves that our legal
system can easily accommodate doctrines that allocate remedies on the
basis of use. At the remedial phase, however, courts again devolve to
ownership formalism, though the remedial affirmation of ownership takes
a different form than it does in nuisance. Rather than award damages to
the adverse possessor or—for that matter—to the true owner, courts reward
use that rises to the level of adverse possession with a blunt injunction.
The remedy is fully bundled ownership for the party who made the
appropriate use of the property. Anything less than such a complete level
of use is rewarded with no recognition of rights at all.
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz is a fairly typical example. In that case, the
dissenting opinion engaged in a more familiar adverse possession analysis
by considering whether the totality of the Lutzes’ actions—namely, the
clearing of an unmaintained and overgrown lot, gardening, raising poultry,
cutting timber, operating a “truck farm,” and keeping a very small dwelling
on it—qualified as sufficient use to warrant ownership by adverse
possession.249 Given the testimony by neighbors that the Lutzes were
overspreading their property with “junk, rubbish and debris,”250 it is not
surprising that the court rejected the Lutzes’ claim of ownership by adverse
possession.251
As the dissent pointed out in Van Valkenburgh, the majority opinion
drew a disturbingly narrow picture of “appropriate” use that favored
246

Id. at 45.
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 211–12
(2010) (arguing that the rule against abandonment of real property embodied by the doctrine of adverse
possession serves important reconstructive and marketability-enhancement functions).
248
See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 28–30 (N.Y. 1952) (analyzing the various
ways the possessors used the land and if it sufficiently established adverse possession).
249
Id. at 31 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
250
Id. at 30 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
251
Id.
247
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aesthetics over subsistence, a move that is only partly surprising given the
classic uses (farming and small business) that the Lutzes were making of
the disputed property.252 One has to wonder whether the all-or-nothing
remedial scheme raises the stakes in cases such as this, especially where
neighborhood opposition exists. Could any part of the Lutzes’ use have
been allowed by the court, especially if that more limited use would not
have drawn the opposition of the neighbors or even the true owner? Such a
question is completely irrelevant in adverse possession doctrine.
Even when adverse possession cases do protect use and reliance
interests to a greater extent than Van Valkenburgh and Joseph, the remedial
extremism in adverse possession doctrine produces several failures. First,
because the ultimate question is whether to completely dispossess the true
owners, rather than whether to allow sharing of property, most courts do
not consider the relevance of the adverse possessor’s use to neighborhood
social and economic relations. In Van Valkenburgh, for example, it was
immaterial for the Court to balance the neighbors’ disgust over the
unsightliness of the Lutzes’ business against the contributions that the
business was making to the neighborhood and local economy. The Lutzes
did not really have the option within the adverse possession prima facie
case to present evidence about whether some neighbors benefited from or
appreciated their occupation of the property. The question was narrowly
construed as one of “actual occupation” as demonstrated by how an
ordinary person would make use of such a property.253 Thus, the
neighbors’ disgust was purportedly relevant only to show that an ordinary
user would not keep junk and rubbish on her property.254
Second, despite the blight of having “wild,”255 “overgrown,”256 and
apparently abandoned lots in the neighborhood in both of these cases, the
particular role played by the adverse possessor in salvaging abandoned
property was ignored, and understandably so given its irrelevance to the
inquiry in adverse possession claims. This is a significant loss because so
much of the value of property use relates to the information it can provide
about an individual’s position in a broader social phenomenon. In these
cases, the phenomenon is that of property abandonment, or at least of
owner absenteeism, but it is by no means the only example. Adverse
possession and trespass cases provide a rich array of other examples,
including dispossession of Native Americans’ land,257 protection of privacy
252
See id. at 33 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (asserting the occupants’ failure to use the entire property
should not prohibit a claim of adverse possession).
253
Id. at 30 (majority opinion).
254
Id.
255
Id. at 31 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
256
Id.; Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
257
See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 307 (Alaska 1990) (evaluating an
ejectment claim on a parcel of land that was included in a native allotment application).
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and free speech rights,
and the aspiration of putting land to more
productive use.259 But again, positioning the individual in a broader social
context is irrelevant when the inquiry focuses on complete, rather than
shared, occupation.
A third failure is the length of time that is required for such use to
ripen into ownership. Typically, the time periods required in cases of
prescription measure in terms of decades;260 indeed, they are often longer
in cases of intentional dispossession.261 Although the passage of time has
served as a convincing theoretical justification for the radical transfer of
ownership that adverse possession produces, it imposes significant costs.
When the adverse possession is viewed as part of a social phenomenon, the
length of time required for rights to ripen creates instability as parties wait
to assert rights and to develop land in explicit coordination with neighbors,
local government, and others. The Joseph case presents another cost of the
lengthy time period: the possibility that a bona fide purchaser could
accidentally acquire the property, thereby presenting a more sympathetic
conflict for a court to have to resolve.262 Of course, such lengthy time
periods would not be necessary if sharing, rather than ripening, was the end
result of adverse possession analyses.
In practical effect, adverse possession doctrine thus limits the range of
outcomes that ought to be possible in these cases in a number of key
respects. First, it precludes the possibility of shared or group rights,
because ownership by groups is harder to define, manage, and protect.263
Second, it precludes consideration of proposed uses that have not yet been
258
See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980) (evaluating a
property owner’s right to eject individuals exercising their free speech and petition rights); State v.
Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370–71 (N.J. 1971) (evaluating a property owner’s trespass claim against
attorneys seeking to speak with clients in private living quarters on property).
259
See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2435
(2001) (asserting that adverse possession forces lazy owners to use their land in a productive manner).
260
See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 185, at 300 (summarizing the statutes of limitation in different
states). They are, however, much shorter in some western states. RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 79 (2d ed. 1999).
261
See SINGER, supra note 185, at 300 (comparing state statutes of limitation for good faith
possession with those for bad faith possession).
262
Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
263
Modern manifestations of this ancient doctrine are, however, far more comfortable with
defining group rights. For example, it is much more possible today for the public to acquire a
prescriptive easement in land. See, e.g., Weidner v. Alaska Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860
P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a public way may be created by public use of private
property for ten years); Fears v. Y.J. Land Corp., 539 N.W.2d 306, 308 (N.D. 1995) (stating that public
roads may be established by prescription under state law). In addition, environmental resources are
often managed on the basis of group rights. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing problems
of collective action faced by individuals using common-pool environmental resources and analyzing
various group-based solutions).
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acted upon by either party.
Finally, it limits the possibility of hybrid
uses that take advantage of the sophistication in long-term land use
planning that has developed in the last few decades.265
2. Trespass
A brief exploration of the flipside of adverse possession, namely the
doctrine of trespass, reveals much the same pattern, although it is arguably
more noteworthy here because exclusion theorists use trespass doctrine to
demonstrate the value of exclusion theory. Consider State v. Shack,266
another iconic case. In that case, Shack and Tejeras, a legal services
lawyer and field worker for a poverty alleviation organization respectively,
entered Tedesco’s farm to find two migrant workers who both worked and
lived on the farm.267 Tedesco confronted them and agreed to let Tejeras
meet with one worker in order to provide basic medical aid.268 However,
upon learning that Shack wished to see a worker for the purpose of
providing legal services, Tedesco refused to allow Shack to meet with the
worker except in Tedesco’s presence.269 When Shack rejected this
condition, Tedesco brought a complaint for criminal trespass against both
Shack and Tejeras.270
The discussion of rights in State v. Shack reminds us that there are
important exceptions to trespass rules that in practice allow people to enter
and use property that they do not own.271 But that is indeed the point: the
exceptions and transfers apply to the absolutist definition of ownership,
with the baseline for exception-making always being ownership by the
plaintiff. For example, teachers of first-year property courses in law
264
Indeed, there is often a long period of prescription and/or a requirement of a reliance interest.
See SINGER, supra note 185, at 307 (describing a moral basis of protecting reliance by an adverse
possessor as a justification for adverse possession doctrine).
265
See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 9–10 (1999) (defending the values of decentralization); PATSY HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE
PLANNING: SHAPING PLACES IN FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES 156 (2d ed. 2006) (highlighting the complex
“contemporary reality of land and property markets”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in)
the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58 (2004) (advocating for the adoption of mixed-use environments to
encourage the improvement of many urban communities).
266
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
267
Id. at 370.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id. at 370–71.
271
See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1956) (holding that unauthorized entry
was privileged when police officers heard moaning coming from inside and knew a sick man lived in
the residence); Rossi v. DelDuca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Mass. 1962) (holding that trespasser was
privileged to do so when the need to escape a dangerous dog required her to cross the property of
another and carving out an exception to a statute providing immunity from liability for dog bites to
property owner); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189–90 (Vt. 1908) (holding that plaintiff’s need to moor
a boat to defendant’s dock during a sudden storm deprived defendant of the right to exclude).
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schools often use Shack to make a meal of the “public interest” exception
to trespass.272 The most common manifestations of the public interest in
trespass cases include anti-discrimination imperatives,273 the rights of the
public vis-à-vis private owners who have opened their property to the
public,274 and notions of necessity.275 As much as they shock new law
students, with their relatively more Blackstonian views of property rights,
these exceptions have more rhetorical than practical value in the wide arc
of trespass cases. At the metaphysical level, they claim that owners must
share property, but at the practical level, they produce only limited sharing.
In general, the opportunity to share is specifically and carefully defined,
while the backdrop right of ownership encompasses a default right of use
that is both broad and general. Thus, in the case of discrimination, only
certain categories of people are protected; owners are at liberty to exclude
arbitrarily anyone who does not fall within those categories.276 Similarly,
in the case of access to businesses, the majority rule remains that only

272
See, e.g., Shack, 277 A.2d at 374 (holding that government workers have a privilege to enter
property so as to provide migrant workers with legal and medical services).
273
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170–72 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
prohibits privately operated non-religious schools from excluding qualified children on the basis of
race); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (holding that application of a stateenforced custom of refusing service to whites in the company of African-Americans violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in the
market for selling or leasing real property).
274
See, e.g., State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me. 1983) (holding that a church could not
revoke its invitation to the general public to come to its meeting hall unless it had a justification); In re
S.M.S., 675 S.E.2d 44, 45–46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“When premises are open to the public, ‘the
occupants of those premises have the implied consent of the owner/lessee/possessor to be on the
premises, and that consent can be revoked only upon some showing the occupants have committed acts
sufficient to render the implied consent void.’” (quoting State v. Marcoplos, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821–22
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002))); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1389 (Pa. 1981) (holding that outdoor
grounds on a private college campus were open to the public within the meaning of a trespass statute
such that the defendants who were arrested for distributing leaflets on those grounds in violation of the
statute were absolved of liability for trespass).
275
See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 1991), amended and
superseded on other grounds, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the necessity defense
“justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to
be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the
crime”); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221–22 (Minn. 1910) (holding the defendant
not liable for trespass because it had a self-protection privilege to tie its ship to the plaintiff's dock in
order to avoid its ship being damaged badly by a tremendous storm); Hager v. Tire Recyclers, Inc., 901
P.2d 948, 952 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), adhered to as modified on other grounds on reconsideration,
906 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that “[t]he privilege of public necessity is limited to
action necessary to avert an impending public disaster”).
276
See, e.g., Keck v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[a]n
inference of discrimination arises where a plaintiff is deprived of services ‘while similarly situated
persons outside the protected class were not’” (quoting Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d
862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001))).
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innkeepers and common carriers have no right to arbitrarily exclude.277 It
is certainly not the case that anyone who pays a predetermined (or
determinable) amount may enter and use the plaintiff’s property.
Thus, in Shack, the relevance of the migrant workers’ labor on
Tedesco’s land to the economic and social structure of the surrounding
area was not considered, perhaps partly because they were not claiming
any rights by prescription. Nor was the broader social phenomenon of
migrant worker exploitation a basis for allowing them to remain on and use
Tedesco’s property.278 The case was one of access to those workers, but
even the broadest interpretation of the opinion would not read into it a
continuing right to remain on the land. In short, because Tedesco’s rights
of ownership were incontestable, the migrant workers’ use of the land
served no doctrinal function. Their use of the land was extensive,
productive, and vigorous. But, in a case about trespass, their status as
workers earned them no opportunities vis-à-vis continued use of the
land.279
Described differently, the remedies in these core areas of property law
fail to take full advantage of the many possibilities that inhere in the
equitable concept of injunctive relief. The practical result is that access to
and use of property remain bundled within the unitary concept of
ownership without opportunity for nuanced development. In Shack, as
well as in Joseph and Van Valkenburgh, the law could not contemplate an
outcome that directly protected shared use among the owner, the
possessor(s), and non-owners. The courts implicitly recognized a limited
right to share by holding that the workers had a right to receive visitors, but
the right was abstractly defined, leaving open questions about what that
right encompassed and its extensiveness. Had such opportunities existed,
the results could have been far less severe and thus less radical than the
results in each of these three cases. Instead, the absolute nature of
ownership prevented the courts from contemplating less radical solutions,
some of which could have resulted in fairer distribution and an even
277
See, e.g., Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 366 A.2d 641, 646 (N.J. 1976) (analogizing
hospitals to common carriers and holding that they can only exclude where there is a rational basis for
doing so); see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1448–49 (1996) (arguing that the current law’s majority limitation
of public accommodation rules to inns and common-carriers is unjustifiable and should be extended to
all businesses that hold themselves out as open to the public).
278
The Court discussed the exploitation of the workers at relatively great length, but not for that
purpose. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–73 (N.J. 1971).
279
As Professor Singer discusses in his analysis of Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Corp., there are clear bases in current law for granting such opportunities. Singer, supra
note 174, at 614–18 (citing Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980)). Moreover, it is also the case that they may have been able to raise wage
and other labor claims if they had filed suit based on their employment status. My point here, however,
is that such claims ought to have been relevant to this property lawsuit as well.
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greater level of doctrinal stability.
3. Implied Easements
To a very profound extent, such remedies do exist in property law, and
not just at the margins. They exist in the form of implied easements that
crop up to remedy injustices in a range of circumstances, for example,
where an adverse possessor merely “uses” property rather than “fully
occupying” it;280 where a party relies on the right to continue using
property as a result of permission once extended;281 where a party has a
stark necessity to continue using property;282 or even where a less stark
necessity exists, so long as the use was sufficiently open, obvious, and
continuous.283
The 1906 case of Stoner v. Zucker284 is a classic example. In that case,
the defendants, with the plaintiff’s permission, invested seven thousand
dollars to build a ditch on the plaintiff’s land for the purpose of carrying
water for irrigation from a nearby river to their own land.285 Despite the
plaintiff’s revocation of that permission just one year later, the defendants
“continuously entered upon plaintiff’s land, making repairs upon the ditch
and restoring the same where it was broken and washed away.”286
Moreover, they “threaten[ed]” to continue to do so.287 The court applied
the traditional doctrine of easement by estoppel, holding that where either
money, labor, or both are expended in reliance upon a “mere parol
license,” such:
[L]icense becomes irrevocable, [and] the licensee will have a
right of entry upon the lands of the licensor for the purpose of
maintaining his structures or, in general, his rights under his
license, and the license will continue for so long a time as the
nature of it calls for.288
Stoner and the other implied easements cases are perhaps the most
unmistakable examples of courts creating shared interests in property. In a
wide range of circumstances where parties claim rights to access and use of
280
See, e.g., Cmty. Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Vt. 1989)
(holding that where a claimant marshals enough evidence to prove “the general outlines consistent with
the pattern of use” of a prescriptive easement throughout the relevant period, “it has met its burden on
that issue”).
281
See, e.g., Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809–10 (Cal. 1906) (easement by estoppel).
282
See, e.g., Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. 1950) (easement by necessity).
283
See, e.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ill. 1987) (easements
implied from prior use).
284
83 P. 808.
285
Id. at 809.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 810.
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“rights of way” over the land of others, including where permission was
initially granted and revoked and where permission was never given,
where the need was great, where the parties relied on access for their own
economic gain, and where parties relied on informal mores or assumptions
of neighborliness, courts have required landowners to share their property
with others. These cases are so compelling in part because of the extent to
which they seamlessly fill gaps between the hard edges of ownership
rights. Moreover, they do so relatively unobtrusively, applying factspecific tests that recognize the commonplace behavior of property owners
and non-owners vis-à-vis each other, without much pomp about the
importance of upholding rights.
These cases are highly successful in this respect because, in contrast to
the nuisance, adverse possession, and trespass cases, the entitlements in
implied easements cases much more closely complement the outcomes.
Such remedies avoid the bundling effects of damages and blunt injunctions
to keep off another’s land, instead granting limited rights of access and use
to non-owners. The remedies, in other words, require the tangible sharing
of land.
Yet, even in these cases, the potential for sharing is hampered by the
formalistic capitulation to ownership norms. For reasons that have no
apparent connection to the real needs of the parties, courts hold that
implied easements are “owned” by those interested in access and use of
rights of way.289 Moreover, these determinations of ownership are not
merely symbolic. They produce a surprisingly bundled right of ownership
to rights of way, which allows their owners to transfer them in connection
with the sale of the dominant estates or to devise them.290 While it may be
argued that such rules promote efficiency in much the same way that
bundled ownership does in other contexts, it could also be argued that any
additional incremental efficiency gain is irrelevant compared to the
inefficiency created by implied easements in general. Efficiency, at least
defined in terms of bright-line ownership, is not the point of these
easements.291
For purposes of this Article, the other obvious limitation of these
easements is that they are generally limited to rights of way. One way to
describe the core normative argument in this Article is to say that the
289
4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.03 (2013) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (stating that
“an easement is a property right in the land of another,” ordinarily subject to the Statute of Frauds).
290
See generally id. at § 34.12 (discussing the extent of easements and stating that “[t]he resulting
aggregation of privileges held by a dominant owner takes its basic framework from the kind of
easement in question . . . . [t]he most significant factor concerning the extent of an easement is the
manner in which the easement is created”).
291
The Restatement (Third) supports my analysis. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 7.10 cmts. a–c (2000) (applying the changed conditions doctrine to easements and
allowing for their modification rather than termination in the face of new circumstances).
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remedial impulse underlying implied easements should be exercised well
beyond disputes over rights of way. Part IV advances that argument.
C. Remedies Redux
The most striking means to demonstrate the ways in which these core
doctrines eliminate basic remedies that ought to be available in property
law is to transpose Calabresi and Melamed’s four remedial rules into a
context more removed from the case of nuisance, which was the doctrinal
palette for Calabresi and Melamed’s framework. In the nuisance context,
the four rules break down as follows:292
TABLE 1
REMEDIES IN NUISANCE
Remedy
Injunction
Damages
No Liability
Purchased Injunction

Result in Pollution Control Context
Defendant must stop polluting
Defendant may pollute, but must pay damages
Defendant may pollute
Defendant must stop polluting so long as
Plaintiff compensates Defendant for doing so

Now consider the four rules in the context of a trespass case. By
focusing on the italicized language in the following table, it quickly
becomes obvious that in the trespass context, two of the rules appear
absurd. Specifically, it appears nonsensical to remedy a trespass case with
damages in the absence of an injunction.
TABLE 2
REMEDIES IN TRESPASS
Remedy
Injunction
Damages
No Liability
Purchased Injunction

Result in Trespass Context
Defendant must stay off Plaintiff’s property
Defendant may enter Plaintiff’s property, but
must pay damages
Defendant may enter Plaintiff’s property
Defendant must stay off Plaintiff’s property so
long as Plaintiff compensates Defendant for
doing so

The notion of ownership as an entitlement precludes the possibility
that an owner claiming trespass would ever have to share use of the
property with the defendant, as a remedial matter. The right in question
automatically determines who may use the property and in what respects.
292

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1115–19.
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It would be too much of an imposition on the right of ownership to allow a
defendant to enter a plaintiff’s property so long as she or he paid damages
for the opportunity to do so. Such an imposition would derogate too much
from the absolutist, and even Blackstonian, nature of ownership.293 The
remedy is an on-off switch either in favor of the plaintiff requiring the
defendant to stay off, or in favor of the defendant allowing the defendant to
enter.
IV. A MODEL FOR SHARING THE CATHEDRAL
The purpose of this Part is to provide a model for making good on the
intuitions of the many judges who instinctively seek ways to allow parties
to share access to and use of private resources. Using Holmes’s outcomefirst framework as the starting point, the model proposes refocusing
decision makers’ attention on property outcomes rather than on property
ownership. The goal is to transform what is currently a more philosophical
recognition of “rights to share” into pragmatic opportunities to share
private property. More broadly, the purpose of the model is to stimulate
the development of a much broader range of property outcomes than those
produced by recognizing rights of bundled ownership. The heart of this
Part is in Section IV.B, which develops the interest-outcome model for
enhancing sharing and other outcomes in certain core areas of property
law, including nuisance, adverse possession, trespass, and implied
easements. By reanalyzing the cases discussed in Part III, first using a
Holmesian approach in Section IV.A, and then in Section IV.C using the
model developed here, this Part provides evidence of the interest-outcome
model’s efficaciousness.
A. The Cathedral as Seen by Holmes: A New View of Prah
The purpose of this Section is to demonstrate that Holmes’s
perspective on outcomes allows much more opportunity to develop
outcomes that involve property sharing and other means of more fairly
distributing property resources. By avoiding the question of who has a
293
See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 598 (2008) (“For quite
some time, the right to exclude in the context of both tangible and intangible property has come to be
associated with an entitlement to exclusionary (injunctive) relief.”); Merrill, supra note 10, at 747
(presenting “historical evidence [which] suggests that the right to exclude . . . is more basic to the
institution of property than are other incidents of property recognized in mature property systems”);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE
L.J. 357, 361–62 (2001) (noting that Blackstone’s essential conception of property was grounded as a
right in rem); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601,
605–07, 618–21 (1998) (noting that Blackstone’s need to justify absolutist conceptions of the right to
exclude via reference to utilitarian concerns continues to be felt in law and economics scholarship).
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right or owes a duty, Holmes’s basic prescription avoids the conflation of
ownership with exclusion. The best illustration of Holmes’s different
perspective on an outcome-centered approach is to apply it. In contrast to
the approaches taken by the Prah majority and minority, as well as by
Calabresi and Melamed, Holmes would simply have skipped over the
question of whether a “nuisance” was committed or an “easement” was
acquired—whether someone had violated a duty or secured a right.294 To
Holmes, these questions would be merely metaphysical, or as Holmes
described it, “moral,”295 and it would be a distraction to squeeze the
resolution of the dispute into the categories of rights imposed by nuisance
and easement laws.296 Instead, by his own description, Holmes would have
looked first at “the facts which make up the group in question,”297 an
analysis that would have considered the parties’ “physical relation” to a
resource “and to the rest of the world” and their “intent.”298 Holmes then
would have considered “the consequences attached by the law to that
group.”299
Returning to Holmes’s property discussion about possession and
ownership in The Common Law, Holmes would have concluded that the
“facts” making up “the group in question” would not look much different
between owner and mere possessor, because both would bear largely the
same “physical relation” to the property “and to the rest of the world.”300
To equate owner with possessor in such a way would necessitate
concentrating analytical attention first and foremost on the ways in which
the parties used the property in dispute. Thus, the first question would
likely have prompted Holmes to consider each party’s needs concerning
the property at issue and the ways in which those needs could be met by
access to and use of that property.
In Prah, there was a high level of accord between the needs and uses
that Prah and Maretti each intended for Maretti’s lot.301 If one sets aside
the dissent’s rhetoric that Maretti, as a property owner, should have had
complete freedom to make whatever physical use of the lot he wished,302 it
appears that he could have built a perfectly serviceable single family home
on the lot in such a manner as to give Prah continued use of the sunlight
294
See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 213–14 (distinguishing possession as a legal right from
possession as a fact and divorcing the notion from morality).
295
Holmes, supra note 30, at 170–71.
296
See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191–92 (Wis. 1982) (referring to the rights at issue
both in terms of “nuisance” and “easements”).
297
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215.
298
Id. at 216.
299
Id. at 215.
300
Id. at 215–16.
301
See Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 191 (“Private nuisance law . . . has the flexibility to protect both a
landowner’s right of access to sunlight and another landowner’s right to develop land.”).
302
Id. at 193–94 (Callow, J., dissenting).
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shining in from above his lot. It is a stretch to argue that by failing to do
so, he committed a nuisance. But it is by no means a stretch to say, as a
remedial matter, that each party deserved protection for his intended use.
On Prah’s side, the inquiry would consider the fact that Prah used his
own property next door for a single family home that contributed to energy
conservation efforts during a time when energy use was of paramount
national concern.304 Thus, Prah’s position within the broader social context
would be completely relevant to the needs he sought to meet. It is also
important that Maretti intended a use that is highly respected and indeed
venerated305 and further that he complied with local zoning and building
laws intended to contribute to longer-term planning and development.306
But that importance can be overstated to the point of having unnatural
influence. Holmes may well conclude that if Maretti’s use could do all
these things and not conflict with Prah’s intended use, then a court should
require Maretti to build in a non-conflicting manner regardless of whether
doing so would constitute a nuisance. For the same reasons, a court would
have a good basis for requiring such accommodations in uses even when
unneighborly behavior was not in evidence (as it may have been on
Maretti’s part).307 In other words, sharing would be a much more obvious
and natural outcome in the absence of a mandate to determine ownership.
So far, Holmes’s conclusions would not have differed much from the
majority’s. And indeed, in Prah, in contrast to many nuisance cases, they
may not have differed at the stage of determining remedies either.308 But it
is important to note that in the typical nuisance case, it would be at the
point of determining remedies that Holmes’s approach would likely differ
substantially from that of many courts because ownership would not
inform Holmes’s determination. In the typical case, an outcome involving
shared use could easily have been derailed by a remedial decision to award
damages to Prah rather than an injunction. For Holmes, by contrast, even
if a property owner’s use were socially beneficial, the fact of ownership
would not prioritize this factor in determining remedies.309 As an
adjudicatory matter, Holmes’s orientation might require the parties to state
303
Id. at 185 (majority opinion). The court indicated that the exact location and feasibility of
different construction plans on Maretti’s lot were disputed, but it did not appear that his chosen location
was the only alternative. Id.
304
Id. at 189; see also Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1218–19 (2009)
(discussing the American legal debate over the importance of solar rights in the last quarter century).
305
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 222, at 951 (arguing that homeownership is of
paramount importance).
306
Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
307
See id. at 185 (noting that Maretti simply ignored Prah’s request to locate his home away from
the plot line dividing their properties).
308
Id. at 191–92.
309
See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 241–42 (noting that nature of ownership generally does not
influence remedies).
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public reasons why their behavior was reasonable as a precondition for
certain outcomes.
This would open up a range of additional remedial options. Most
obviously, by evaluating remedy before ownership, Holmes might have
tailored the injunctive reach, thereby giving Prah incentive to provide an
ongoing social benefit through his particular property use. For example,
Holmes might have chosen to protect Prah’s use only so long as he
maintained the solar panels on his home. This is something courts are
familiar with enforcing in the context of applying the law of easements,310
and which the Restatement (Third) on Servitudes would push even
further.311 Doing so as a remedial matter, however, would give the
advantage of flexibility in managing uses over time, including changing
uses prospectively in light of long-term planning efforts. The nuisance
case of Armstrong v. Francis Corp.,312 is one of a number of examples
representing the inchoate remedial potential in these cases. Before the
nuisance suit was filed in that case, the parties had mapped out a quite
detailed and context-specific remedy during settlement discussions, which
the court ultimately imposed.313
The possibilities for flexible injunctions are even more apparent in the
pollution example used by Calabresi and Melamed. By removing the
conceptual hurdle of ownership, Holmes may well have suggested an
approach that could lead to more efficient results or to better distributive
outcomes using Calabresi and Melamed’s own metrics, than the authors
argued could be accomplished by using liability rules such as the
purchased injunction.314 In the original analysis, a wealthy neighborhood
full of homeowners could pay a coal company to install filters that would
reduce the pollution emanating from the factory.315 The authors argued
that such a remedy would be better as a distributive matter, because the
hypothetical factory employed many lower-income workers.316
A
framework following Holmes would add to the remedial options by more
directly managing the uses made of the coal factory. Such a remedy could
operate by requiring that the workers be given more opportunity to choose
uses that would protect their own health. Alternatively, it could be a
directive from the court that the subsidy provided by the rich neighboring
landowners be used by the factory owners to transition to a cleaner form of
energy than a coal plant. The first alternative would protect the workers’
310
In particular, abandonment is a basis for terminating an easement. 4 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 34.18 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2013).
311
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (2000).
312
120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956).
313
Id. at 7.
314
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1120–21.
315
Id. at 1121.
316
Id.
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health as well as their economic welfare. The second would internalize
harmful externalities by imposing intergenerational protections for nonparties to the case. With their interest in all-or-nothing “property rules,”
however, Calabresi and Melamed did not focus on this traditional tool of
injunctive relief developed by the courts of equity.317
The point is that injunctions that avoid all-or-nothing results are far
more likely to require all the parties in the dispute to share in both the
benefit and in the responsibility associated with property possession, use,
and ownership. Such remedies can be more closely linked to the parties’
needs vis-à-vis the property. Even the short list of additional outcomes
provided here ought to hint at the possibilities for distributional justice.
Given the costs invested in applying the muddy nuisance test, it is only
fitting that better tailored outcomes are among the benefits that accrue.
B. Holmes Translated: The Interest-Outcome Model Developed
At this stage, it is important to acknowledge that Holmes’s two-part
prescription is really only a beginning point. It is an important one, but it
can nevertheless be difficult to imagine what exactly could replace an
inquiry into ownership in a framework where questions of title are
deferred. In fact, however, much of the work accomplished by recent
scholarship in searching for a more expansive concept of property
entitlements is particularly effective in answering Holmes’s first question.
Specifically, notions of social obligation,318 capabilities,319 personhood,320
democratic community,321 positive rights,322 and interconnectedness323 all
can and should be relevant considerations in determining what facts make
up the group in question. By importing these concepts into Holmes’s basic
317

Id. at 1118–19.
See Alexander, supra note 11, at 752 (arguing that a “robust version of the social-obligation
norm explains many of the most controversial legal practices in which owners have been required to
sacrifice either some use of their entitlement or the entitlement itself”).
319
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 70–86 (arguing that human capabilities should help
determine political ideals and formulate the rights guaranteed to every citizen).
320
See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982)
(considering “how the personhood perspective can help decide specific disputes between rival
claimants”).
321
See Singer, supra note 111, at 1059 (noting that “the allocation and exercise of property rights
imposes externalities on others and on social life in general” and “property owners have obligations to
use their rights in ways that are compatible with the basic norms of our society”).
322
THOMAS MEYER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 57–59 (2007).
323
See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 29, at 163 (“Whether the case involves a physical
interdependence or other interconnectedness (of an ecological, biological, economic, or other nature)
between the interests that the dueling claims assert . . . the foundational assumption that a right
deserves presumptive power because of the uniquely worthy nature of the values that it asserts fails
across a wide range of property cases.”); Singer, supra note 111, at 1047 (“[P]roperty law concerns not
just relations between persons and things but relations among persons with respect to valued
resources.”).
318
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prescription, this Section adapts it for use in resolving modern property
disputes. Moreover, as the following description of the model should
make clear, the major adjustment for property theory and doctrine is
conceptual rather than substantive. Courts regularly do the basic things
this model proposes, but not for the purpose this model proposes. By
adjusting both the purpose for which courts should evaluate property use
and the timing of such evaluation, this model opens a path to expanding the
range of outcomes in property law and, in particular, to recapturing the
inchoate power of sharing.
1. “[W]hat are the facts which make up the group in question[?]”324
Recall that this was the only question Holmes proposed asking prior to
determining the appropriate outcome in a given dispute. In applying this
question to his property example, Holmes observed that in property law, a
basic consideration in defining a group that ought to receive a remedy is
that group’s particular “physical relation to [an] object and to the rest of
the world.”325 Holmes’s interest in the physicality of the relationship
suggests that he shared a common understanding with adjudicators
involved in the early writ system that the physical use of the property
mattered a great deal in determining outcomes in disputes over the
property.
There are three respects in which the interest-outcome approach
proposed here differ quite meaningfully from Holmes’s basic prescription.
In adapting Holmes’s first question to modern property disputes, this
model seeks both to modernize and to make more specific the common
insight shared by the early writ system and Holmes. Understanding use is
still central to the task of understanding how parties relate to property, but
in this modern world use is no longer the only basis for understanding that
relationship. Nor in contemporary relationships is use defined so much by
physicality. Finally, while it may be argued that Holmes’s “bad man”
would be concerned only with the economic consequences of his actions,
the model proposed here would require a consideration of social context
well beyond quantifiable economic consequences. Although the model
proposed here concurs fully with Holmes’s basic point that formal title
ought to be much less important normatively in determining access to and
use of property than it currently is, the model does not go so far as to agree
with Holmes that it makes no difference whether the party seeking a
remedy is a “child” or a “powerful ruffian” so long as she demonstrates the
requisite interest in possession.326 In the interest-outcome approach
proposed here, that difference would be completely relevant, because the
324

HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215.
Id. at 216.
326
Id. at 235.
325
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first step in determining the facts making up the group in question would
be to apply the core lesson from negotiation theory by determining what
legitimate interests to the property are demonstrated by each of the
parties.327
While there are disputes in which one party enters upon or uses an
owner’s property without any legitimate basis for doing so, as the literature
on “governance property” discusses, there are many more situations where
the non-owner has a legitimate interest that may justify some level of
access or use. Where there is no legitimate interest conflicting with the
owner’s claim of formal title, Professor Smith’s exclusion paradigm,
relying on designations of formal title and broad rights of exclusion,328 is
appropriate both on fairness and efficiency grounds. But where parties
other than the formal owner have legitimate interests to the property, the
exclusion paradigm is not of much help, once again on both fairness and
efficiency grounds.
How then does a legal decision maker go about the task of determining
whether a party has a legitimate interest in the property, in the vein of
negotiation theory, as distinguished from the position of being a titleholder or not? One way to do so is to determine whether the party has
formal title. Such an inquiry creates a clear rule, but, for all the reasons
discussed in this Article, if the decision maker stops there she ignores
many interests that could and should be protected in a sharing world. A
second way is to evaluate “entitlements,” more broadly defined as
Professor Singer has done, to include specific legal rights even if those
rights do not rise to the level of full, formal rights of ownership.329 Such
an evaluation makes sense as a starting point for the interest-outcome
approach, both because entitlements are so often associated with and
representative of legitimate interests and because they recognize that
different people and relationships can coexist with respect to different
rights in the property bundle.330 However, the cases with which this
Article is most concerned are the cases in which uses overlap, and, as
shown in Part III, such cases often involve interests that can be described
as “legitimate” where the party has no “entitlement,” even when the latter
term is broadly defined.
Thus, this Article proposes that in such cases, the question of whether
a party has a legitimate interest should also be investigated by answering
three questions about the use such party is making or proposes to make of
the property. The first question that ought to be asked about use is what
327
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 35–37 (advising that parties in a negotiation should
identify each other’s interests).
328
See supra notes 113–25 and accompanying text.
329
SINGER, supra note 29, at 14.
330
Id. at 94.
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exactly the various parties to the dispute—both owners and non-owners—
are doing with the property. The second question would ask how the rest
of the world perceives such uses. The third question would seek
information about the parties’ intent vis-à-vis the property, both their
intended uses and their intent concerning the myriad other interests that
define property ownership. These three questions would be asked for the
quite specific purpose of investigating possible outcomes, including how
the disputed property could be shared. A moment’s comparison with the
evaluation of use in adverse possession ought to make clear how this
model is different. In such a context, use is evaluated, but neither using the
same terms, nor with such specificity, nor—most importantly—for the
same end. Adverse possession ends in exclusion. This model evaluates
use for the purpose of sharing.
Consider each question in turn. As concerns the first question, it
should suffice to say that the inquiry would not perform the relatively
crude task of sifting and protecting appropriate uses, as in the case of
adverse possession. Rather, it would classify uses as a first step in
determining the appropriate remedy for any given class of use. Most
prominently, it would evaluate uses for signs of compatibility which could
lead to sharing along one or more dimensions or at least to injunctions that
would not exclude one or more parties completely as a means of protecting
the “full” property rights of another.
The second question would consider such uses as perceived by the
“rest of the world.” Thus, the model considers these uses in the broader
social context surrounding the parties, taking into consideration the needs
of the community concerning property of the type at issue,331 the trends in
development of such property,332 and the ways in which such property has
or has not supported local and regional economic development.333
Additionally, the model considers the needs of each party to access and use
the property, including the capabilities that could be thereby enhanced.334
As a related matter, the model considers each party’s moral connection to
331
There are many examples of this outward-looking perspective in adjudicating property
disputes. One particularly effective one, because of the balance drawn between breadth and specificity,
is a recent model proposed to address cultural property disputes. See Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In
Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028–29 (2009) (arguing that “legal claims to indigenous
cultural property” need to take into consideration the rights of non-owners).
332
See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 265, at 9–12 (arguing that city services should be transformed into
vehicles for community building); Garnett, supra note 265, at 4 (discussing the “relationship between
property regulation and order-restoration efforts”); Peter Pollock, A Comment on Making Sustainable
Land-Use Planning Work, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2009) (discussing “barriers to effective
implementation of local land-use planning tools for sustainable development”).
333
This type of inquiry advocates, and owes a debt to, the social obligation approach proposed by
Gregory Alexander as well as the democracy-enhancing approach proposed by Joseph Singer.
Alexander, supra note 11, at 748–52; Singer, supra note 111, at 1057–61.
334
NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 70–74.
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the property. Such an inquiry could encompass the personhood (and
peoplehood) perspectives advocated by Professor Radin and others.335 But
it would also be more basic, considering, for example, whether favoring
one party would promote speculation,336 absentee ownership, abandonment
or dis-use, loss of freedom and subsistence, spite, or un-neighborly
behavior.
Much of this inquiry would also elucidate relevant facts about the third
question of intent, which Holmes suggests is also relevant in a property
dispute.337 The point of such an inquiry would be first to determine the
extent to which the parties’ intents (and needs) were compatible, without
the gratuitous insertion of ownership predetermining the answer. In
Joseph, for example, it seems entirely conceivable that such an inquiry
would find a continuing interest on the Whitcombes’ part in maintaining
the property as a family home and passing it on to their children, while the
bona fide purchaser may well have been satisfied with a monetary
remedy.338 Even in Shack, it seems quite possible that granting the workers
a more permanent right to use the property could have provided a
meaningful protection for their subsistence while not intruding overmuch
on Tedesco’s ownership rights.339 To the contrary, it could have provided
Tedesco a very stable source of income. Where the decision maker did
find the parties’ intent to be incompatible, an inquiry into intent could
provide valuable information about appropriate remedies. In such a
circumstance, the model proposed here would not shy away from making
basic judgments about the broader impacts of use. Rather, the model
would urge a strong correlation between the parties’ intent and the social
implications of the uses made of the property.
335
Radin, supra note 320; see also Carpenter et al., supra note 331, at 1028–29 (arguing that
“legal claims to indigenous cultural property” need to take into consideration the rights of non-owners);
David L. Rosendorf, Comment, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis of Economic and
Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 701, 709 (1990) (“The basic premise of the personality approach is that the close interrelation
between certain forms of property and personhood justify, to some extent, the creation of property
rights.”).
336
I acknowledge the possibility that speculation can produce beneficial land development, but
here I refer to a subcategory that produces the opposite effects. See C.E. Elias, Jr. & James Gillies,
Some Observations on the Role of Speculators and Speculation in Land Development, 12 UCLA L.
REV. 789, 793–94 (1965) (noting that when a speculator lacks information, fluctuations in land prices
will increase, average prices over time may increase, “orderly city growth will be hindered, and urban
sprawl will be promoted”).
337
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 216.
338
See Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that a
family that openly occupied a bungalow for an extended time period but failed to establish an initial
claim of right did not acquire the property through adverse possession).
339
See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 375 (N.J. 1971) (holding that a field worker and an attorney
who entered private property to aid migrant farm workers employed and housed there were not
trespassing).
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Additionally, an inquiry into intent would perform the important
remedial function of ascertaining and assessing proposed future uses by the
parties in a dispute. In this respect, the model would move beyond
doctrines such as adverse possession, which do important work in
protecting the reliance interest. However, such doctrines only indirectly
attempt to privilege more beneficial uses of property.340 Their ability to
perform any real level of long term, large scale planning is seriously
impaired by their backward-looking orientation.
Before moving to the model’s second stage of analysis, it is worth
pausing over the question of why an inquiry into use is so helpful here.
The answer to this question is that it is not really any more helpful to
consider use than the other interests associated with property. The point
rather is to consider something more than exclusion. By concentrating on
property use, this model seeks to disrupt the connection between
ownership and exclusion. By rendering use relevant, indeed coequal with
exclusion, this model argues that the fact of ownership should not
automatically dictate the outcome of exclusion. Other interests could
substitute for use in accomplishing this purpose. Indeed, this model
concentrates on use in part because of its flexibility in incorporating
aspects of these other interests.
It is appropriate to acknowledge here that this first step in the interestoutcome approach requires a normative judgment about the legitimacy of a
party’s interest to the disputed property and further that such an inquiry
may often require evaluation of formal entitlements, more broadly defined.
However, title and entitlements would not be the sole focus of the inquiry.
Moreover, such an inquiry would intentionally be a relatively brief and
quite inclusive inquiry precisely to allow a greater consideration of
interests for the purpose of fashioning remedies in the second step in this
approach.
Finally, it is important to note the vivid contrast between the inquiry
proposed here and the individualized model of inquiry imposed by the
exclusion model. In the interest-outcome approach, the position of the
individual vis-à-vis a similarly situated group grounds the question of what
remedy is due. Is the individual a member of a group experiencing similar
challenges in use of property? If so, how does that affect the type and
scope of use that the individual seeks? These are the key questions in the
model proposed here. By contrast, they are often largely irrelevant when a
court begins by considering who owns the disputed property.
This is one of a number of respects in which starting with ownership
gets in the way. Obviously, the inquiry proposed in this model could be
performed either in the context of determining rights of ownership or as a
340

Stake, supra note 259, at 2435–36.
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second order question in the manner proposed by Calabresi and Melamed.
Indeed, some of the substance that gives meaning to the interest-outcome
model has been developed as a means of expanding the ownership or
entitlement question in order to make it more useful to more people.341
Doing so, however, dilutes the effect of the inquiry by prematurely cutting
off certain remedial options and, more indirectly, by rendering parts of the
inquiry less relevant. In these respects, the model proposed here offers an
application of negotiation theory to property law as a means of giving
recent critiques of the ownership model more potency. Moreover, given
the reality that in the particular doctrinal areas addressed by this Article
courts routinely engage in muddy, fact-based investigations of use, this
model would maximize the benefits flowing from the costs of more
extensive investigations.
2. “[W]hat are the consequences attached by the law to that
group[?]”342
The second and ultimate question for Holmes was to determine the
appropriate outcome or “consequence” in a given dispute, though it is the
penultimate stage of inquiry in the model proposed here. The imperative at
this stage of the inquiry would be to translate the information about
legitimate interests and use obtained in the first stage of the analysis into a
range of viable outcomes (or, in the terminology of negotiation theory,
“trades”).343 Such an inquiry would potentially—indeed hopefully—
produce a broader range of nuanced and specific outcomes. In the case of
State v. Shack, for instance, the particular outcome may well depend on the
extent to which the migrant workers who worked on Tedesco’s farm
contributed to Tedesco’s income, the local economy, and their families in
other countries. These facts would define the compatibility of legitimate
interests between the workers and Tedesco.
A second imperative under this model would be to match injunctive
relief to the legitimate interests of each of the parties. Indeed, the greatest
contribution of this model could well be to tie such interests, including the
extent, type, scope, and quality of uses, directly to injunctive relief—
thereby allowing the natural consequences to flow from the instincts judges
express in their search for more a fair distribution. The object here would
be, quite explicitly, to take advantage of the breadth of property
injunctions, thereby recognizing both the uniqueness of property and the
341
Singer, supra note 111, at 1022–23; see also Alexander, supra note 11, at 749 (“Property
rights and their correlative obligations are cognizable as social goods, worthy of vindication by the
state, only insofar as they are consistent with community and human flourishing more generally.”).
342
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215.
343
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 35–37 (advising that parties in a negotiation should
“identify each other’s interests, resources, and capabilities” in order to create value).
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unique positions of each of the parties vis-à-vis the property at issue.
It should be plain by now that this model proposes that use is not just
an analytical tool in the search for richer property outcomes, but also a
primary form of remedy. There are two aspects of use as a remedy in this
model that warrant special attention. The first is that this model
encourages legal decision makers to resolve disputes by promoting sharing.
The rental of residential property in a jurisdiction such as New Jersey
provides a good example of how to accomplish sharing in contexts well
beyond rights of way. In that state, the rights of tenants to remain on the
property are so highly protected that the law substantially limits the
landlord from deciding whether to discontinue renting her property.344 As
a consequence, although an owner can initially decide whether or not to
rent property, once that decision has been made in favor of rental, it
requires sharing by the landlord as owner of an investment property with
the tenant as occupier of a home.345
This model advocates for legal protections of the types afforded to
tenants in New Jersey to be provided in a much wider array of disputes,
that is, in doctrinal areas well beyond the area of landlord-tenant law. One
basic example is the adoption of hybrid models that close the gap between
home ownership and rental of the types proposed by Professor Lee Anne
Fennell and others.346 In the employment context, this could result in
hybrids that allow workers greater rights to use a property for their
livelihoods, while the rights of shareholders are limited to the opportunity
to receive income rather than decisions about whether and when to close
down a property’s use for a particular business purpose.347 It is important
to note in these two contexts the difference between the models proposed
by others that focus on hybrid forms of ownership as contrasted with the
model proposed here. The point would not be to transfer or even really
transform ownership, but rather to expand opportunities to access and use.
Moreover, the simultaneity of uses is possible in more settings than those
involving investors on the one hand and those making physical use of the
344
James E. Tonrey, Jr., Comment, Protecting Tenants from Foreclosing Mortgagees: New
Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act in the Post-Guttenberg Era, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1006, 1022–23 (1993);
Donna Rolando, N.J. Renters Mostly Safe from Foreclosure, THE RECORD (Bergen Cnty., N.J.), May
11, 2008, at R02; see Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral Damage Arising from the
Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 991–94 (2010) (evaluating New Jersey’s tenant
protections as a model for other jurisdictions).
345
Johnson, supra note 344, at 991–94.
346
Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1129–32 (2008); see also
Dickerson, supra note 222, at 190 (arguing that “existing homeowner subsidies should be replaced with
targeted subsidies that encourage people to make rational and socially beneficial housing choices that
are not based on any idealized notion of the importance of achieving the status of homeowner”).
347
Professor Singer discusses similar possibilities in considering the reliance interest. See Singer,
supra note 174, at 739 (arguing that “judges should change certain common law rules . . . that allow
businesses to ignore the workers’ reliance interests”).
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property on the other. Even in the case of an owner with a strong moral
connection to a particular parcel of land, it is quite likely that such an
owner would not require the use of her property down to the “center of the
earth,”348 and that a court could find ways in which to accommodate other
uses beyond the limitations imposed by traditional implied easements.349
The second noteworthy aspect of use as a remedial option would be
that such use would be detached from the trappings of ownership. By
contrast with easements, for example, uses bestowed as remedies could be
non-exclusive and non-transferable, yet also quite permanent.350 Such uses
could change over time, or in response to the changing behaviors of the
parties involved. Or they could change in response to changes in local land
use and development. They could be shared between owners, non-owners,
and groups. The point is that the concept of ownership would not cabin
them into a known package of rights and expectations.
By turning use behaviors and expectations into remedies, this Article
seeks to extract the greatest efficiency as well as distributive benefit from
the costs already sunk into evaluating uses for the purpose of determining
who has experienced what types of harms. In effect, the model expands
upon a basic device employed in regulation of commons such as fishing
grounds, where uses are regulated by amount per individual over time.351
By exploring the compatibility of different uses to different (though at
times complementary) resources, rather than the same use to a single
resource (namely a commons), this Article expands the utility of the device
well beyond its original setting.
3. Whither Ownership? Deferring Without Denying
At some level, entitlements and duties are inevitably intertwined with
remedies. At some point in the analysis, an outcome-centered approach
must include considerations of whether a particular remedy imposes
unfairly or disproportionately on any given entity, especially if such an
entity has not contributed substantially to the claimed harms. Indeed, such
an approach would likely falter more over the problem of evaluating who
owes the remedy rather than the question of who has a right to it. The
problem of duty is really a more difficult one than the problem of
entitlements.
The model proposed here does not claim that legal decision makers
348
Blackstone appears to have been an early proponent of the assumption that ownership goes this
far. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18.
349
Indeed, the new Restatement on Servitudes appears to go exactly in that direction.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.8(3) (2000).
350
In some respects, then, they could be seen as licenses. The point would be that the court would
involve itself in shaping the remedy rather than in defining the right of ownership on the one hand and
the license on the other.
351
Smith, supra note 123, at 453–56.
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should dispense entirely with questions of duty, ownership, and
entitlement. In this respect, this Article parts company with Holmes’s
rather casual dismissal of the concept of duty.352 This also is a basis for
distinguishing the central argument here from the prescriptive notion of
usufructory rights in determining claims over water and other
environmental resources.353 The argument is not that rights of use ought to
trump rights of ownership, nor that ownership is irrelevant. The model
proposed here does not seek simply to achieve relatively permanent rights
of use.
Rather, under the interest-outcome model, formal entitlements would
first enter the inquiry as a first step in determining legitimate interests.
Then, under the model, neither formal title nor formal entitlements (more
broadly defined) would enter into the inquiry until after some of the basic
choices about remedy have been made. Entitlements (including formal
title) ought to inform decisions about remedial source, administration, and
sometimes even form, rather than about the availability of a remedy in the
first instance. Calabresi and Melamed demonstrated the benefits of
prioritizing remedy over entitlement quite effectively when they argued
that a neighborhood of rich homeowners ought still to be entitled to a
remedy as a result of pollution from a factory using cheap coal but
employing many low-income workers.354 The question was not whether
the homeowners lost all hope of a remedy when faced with compelling and
countervailing distributional considerations. Instead, they argued, both the
distributional and efficiency considerations should inform the shape and
source of the remedy in such a case.355
The question then is when and how in the interest-outcome model to
return to the inquiry about ownership and formal entitlements. This is an
important question indeed, because a careful answer can accomplish much
in balancing the benefits gained from physical access to and use of
property with those gained from more abstract means of investment in
property that accompany the “right” of ownership, including the gains to
be made from its rental, collateralization, or sale. Without achieving such
a balance, this model would justifiably be criticized for eliminating the
marketability of title, which is surely one of the most powerful benefits of
ownership.
352

Holmes, supra note 30, at 174–75.
See Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?: The Need for a New
Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 766 (1974) (explaining “the
principle of stewardship, under which ownership or possession of land is viewed as a trust, with
attendant obligations to future generations as well as to the present”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 508 (arguing that water usage rights should be allocated by a government
permit system).
354
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1121.
355
Id.
353

714

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:647

The answer proposed by this model is that the expansive inquiry into
use promoted here would expose each party’s moral connection to the
property in dispute, and that this moral connection could and should be the
basis for determining how ownership and other formal entitlements ought
to shape the remedy. Here again, the model builds on the recognition in
recent scholarship that the “moral” nature of human interaction with
property is both important as a legal matter and currently underrecognized.356
The two contributions that this Article makes to this scholarship are
first to draw attention to the ways in which property use can expose such
moral connections and make them relevant to the remedial inquiry. Such
an inquiry ought to be detailed enough to provide basic and replicable
information about the parties’ moral relationship to the property at issue.
Upon exposing this relationship, the decision maker can then determine the
extent to which ownership and other formal entitlements represent and
protect it. To the extent that the connection is weak, this model would
accord such formal rights less priority in shaping the remedy in a given
dispute. By justifying adverse possession on exactly these grounds,
Holmes again is the originator of this feature of the model.357 Secondly,
property use can be a basis for building upon Professor Radin’s basic
argument that “personal” property deserves (and often receives) greater
protection than “fungible” property.358 Thus, in the case of personal
property, the owner would have more complete rights of use, while an
owner of fungible property may well have to share use rights with nonowners or may lose aspects of her property’s use to others.
In relying on the moral connection as a means of determining the
relevance of ownership to remedial outcomes, this model emphasizes a
core feature of traditional property doctrines that has become undervalued
in contemporary property law with its veneration of the property owner’s

356
See PENNER, supra note 10, at 2–3 (describing a legal system of property rights acting as a
moral system as well); Carpenter et al., supra note 331, at 1125 (arguing indigenous people have
inherent moral rights in cultural property); Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV.
437, 476–77 (2011) (discussing “moral intuition” as a source of property rights); Peñalver, supra note
163, at 859–60 (demonstrating moral bases for ownership beyond wealth maximization); Radin, supra
note 320, at 978, 983 n.91 (applying Hegel’s “community morality” concept to personhood rights in
property and describing the manifestation of property rights through moral consensus); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 806 (2003)
(defining property-right boundaries through a “concept of right”); Rosendorf, supra note 335, at 709–
11, 731–32 (discussing Radin’s “personhood” approach as a moral basis for property rights in the
homeless).
357
Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (quoting a Holmes letter
stating that an adverse possessor “shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown
to a certain size, cannot be displaced without cutting at his life”).
358
Radin, supra note 320, at 987.
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359

ability to transfer property.
By tying the parties’ moral connection to
property to their future opportunities to use it, the model reminds us that
equitable remedies in property law have long existed to allow owners to
take advantage of the uniqueness of their land.360 Moreover, this Article
argues that legal decision makers can more fully recognize land’s
uniqueness by adding options and nuance to the spectrum of remedies than
they can simply by protecting ownership with a blunt Blackstonian
hammer. Relatedly, the inquiry into moral connections can invoke the
additional question, often relevant in considerations of equity, about the
extent of “fault” attributable to either party.
Finally, note that the interest-outcome approach leaves space for the
definition of entitlements after outcome is defined. This, then, is the third
way in which entitlements remain relevant to this model. Rather than
looking for owners and assigning outcomes on that basis, this model
proposes that judges look for outcomes and then assign entitlements to
match those outcomes.
C. The Model Applied to Adverse Possession, Trespass, and Implied
Easements
The purpose of applying the interest-outcome model to the cases
discussed in Part III is to demonstrate that these relatively minor
adjustments in the substantive analysis can produce a profoundly richer
and broader array of potential outcomes in property disputes, many of
which involve property sharing. To the extent there is a barrier to adopting
this model, it is not a problem of pragmatism.
1. Adverse Possession
Returning first to the Joseph case, the court began, as in any adverse
possession case, with the question of whether the parties claiming adverse
possession had satisfied the elements necessary to wrest ownership from
These elements required that the
the so-called “true owner.”361
Whitcombes’ possession be adverse, actual, open and notorious, hostile,
exclusive, continuous, and asserted under a claim of right.362 In assessing
359

Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1378 (2011).
See Nancy Perkins Spyke, What’s Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and Indeterminacy in
Land’s Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 420–22 (2004) (surveying the long history of
heightened legal regard for property in land predicated on its uniqueness and its importance to personal
and cultural identity); Will Hendrick, Comment, Pay or Play?: On Specific Performance and Sports
Franchise Leases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 504, 512–13 (2009) (arguing that specific enforcement of contracts
for sale of land by courts is justified because of the unique geophysical identity of each parcel, the
subjective value attached to non-investment residential, as opposed to commercial, property, and also
possibly the connection in American legal thought between real property and personhood).
361
Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
362
Id.
360
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especially the elements of adverse, actual, exclusive, and continuous
possession, the court would have to evaluate particular aspects of the use
made by the Whitcombes; but of course, it would have done so to
determine whether to transfer ownership to them.
By contrast, this model would evaluate legitimate interests as a basis
for determining what outcome, if any, was appropriate for the
Whitcombes, as well as for the bona fide purchaser who had bought the
property from the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale.363 It would do
so by applying the three-part test developed in Section IV.B. First, the
model would require an assessment of the legitimate interests of each of
the parties. Given the basic disutility of formal title as a basis for
determining legitimate interests in a case like this, the first real question
would be whether either party had a formal entitlement (broadly defined)
to the property.364 In most jurisdictions, even if not in New York, it would
be reasonable to expect a court to conclude that the Whitcombes’ extensive
use, combined with the effective abandonment by the owner who preceded
the bona fide purchaser, might create a formal right of continued use. But,
without expanding the inquiry into interests beyond formal entitlements, it
would be difficult to examine what interests Joseph, the bona fide
purchaser, might have had to the property. In a case like Joseph v.
Whitcombe, this is where the very expensive inquiry into legitimate
interests could add value that we might not find in a model focusing on
rights.
Again, in determining what legitimate interests exist beyond formal
rights, this model asks three questions about use. The first question would
ask about the use made by each of the parties. On the Whitcombes’ part,
that use consisted of reclaiming the property from flooding, rehabilitating
it so that is was no longer “overgrown,” fixing and maintaining both the
interior and exterior, and, in short, treating it for twenty years as an
ordinary homeowner would.365 As a result, the objective evidence strongly
indicated that the Whitcombes had developed a deep moral connection
both to the property at issue and to the neighborhood in which it was
located.366 On the other hand, Joseph’s use of the property was
prospective,367 and the court did not pursue the facts that would satisfy this
model’s requirements for purposes of comparing uses. Perhaps Joseph
planned to use the property as a residential home as well, and indeed
363

Id. at 45.
SINGER, supra note 29, at 91–94.
365
Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45–46.
366
See id. at 45 (describing the neighborhood’s general acceptance of the Whitcombes’
occupation).
367
The court did not describe Joseph’s intended uses of the property because they were irrelevant
to the question of whether the Whitcombes had acquired the property by adverse possession. Id. at 46.
364
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perhaps his subsistence needs were greater than the Whitcombes’ needs.
Or perhaps he intended to use the property for conservation purposes, or
for purposes of redevelopment or sale. In any of these cases, the point of
this inquiry would not be to rank the uses in order of preference, but rather
to consider whether and how the uses could be protected.
In this first step, a further inquiry would involve considering the
impact of each party’s use on the “rest of the world.”368 Thus, in contrast
to an adverse possession analysis, it would be central to the inquiry in the
interest-outcome model that the Whitcombes had occupied and improved
property that was abandoned and overgrown, that they had integrated the
property back into the neighborhood, and that they had advanced their own
livelihoods as well as provided a welcome product to the local
community.369 The model would go even further in developing the facts in
this line of inquiry. Specifically, did the Whitcombes’ activities contribute
to or detract from conservation efforts in the neighborhood? What were
the trends in housing development in the neighborhood? To what extent
was homelessness a problem in that place and at that time, and what was
the overall effect of “squatting” in the area? From an economic
perspective, what would be the value in leaving the property idle, and how
would such value compare to the value of immediate use by a needy
family? The model would, of course, ask these same types of questions
regarding Joseph’s intended uses of the property, and the answers may well
produce a conflict if those intentions were quite similar to the
Whitcombes’.370 The final consideration at this first stage would be to
examine the parties’ intent concerning future use of the property. Note
again the irrelevance of this question in determining ownership by adverse
possession.371 But under this model, the answer could open up the
possibility of sharing that could largely satisfy the needs of all the parties,
while also contributing to longer-range planning within the neighborhood
structure.
The second step under the interest-outcome model would be to
determine the appropriate remedies for the parties. Again, one of the
claimed virtues of this model is that it would likely lead to fewer all-ornothing outcomes. Given the involvement of a business in the purchase of
the disputed property in Joseph,372 for example, there is a hint of a
possibility that the true owner would have been satisfied with a remedy
368

HOLMES, supra note 32, at 216.
Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45–46.
370
Note here the different balance established by this model: it would respect the Whitcombes’
efforts in reclaiming abandoned property, but it would also consider Joseph’s plans in that regard.
371
A minority of jurisdictions still require subjective intent, but most do not. SINGER, supra note
185, at 299.
372
Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
369
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that protected his investment in the property, but not necessarily the right
to live in it. If the court found this to be true, one remedial means of
acknowledging it would be by the use of a relatively traditional liability
rule awarding damages to Joseph, while allowing the Whitcombes to keep
the property.373
By contrast, since the Whitcombes had apparently never had the
expectation of complete ownership,374 the court may well have been able to
protect their primary interest in the property by giving them a long-term
opportunity to live in the property but not to transfer it by sale, will, or
other means. This could be accomplished by giving Joseph the limited
right to dispose of it by sale after the Whitcombes had completed a longterm tenancy in the property. Or it could be accomplished by a traditional
future interest in Joseph rather than a fee simple interest in the
Whitcombes. Alternatively, the court could have granted Joseph part of
the net profit from sale when (if ever) the Whitcombes disposed of the
property. Or, instead, it might have granted Joseph an option to purchase
the property if the Whitcombes ever put it up for sale.
The point is that the range of outcomes is much broader than current
adverse possession doctrine allows and it is by no means apparent that
efficiency or other gains justify those remedial limitations. Moreover, the
examples demonstrate the much greater opportunity for sharing by
dividing the interests in the bundle, by dividing them over time, or—more
familiarly—by awarding damages to Joseph, in short, by dividing both the
rights and the responsibilities. Of course if Joseph had the intention of
living in the property himself, simultaneous use-based remedies would
have been much harder to achieve. But one goal of this model is to avoid
such examples of true use conflicts by giving parties like the Whitcombes
the opportunity to claim a remedy before the advent of a bona fide
purchaser with similar intentions.
The third step would be to consider the relevance of ownership. In this
case, the Whitcombes, who were not the “true owners” of the property,
demonstrated as deep a moral connection to it as is imaginable.375 Here
too, the moral connection acted as a challenge to the monolithic fact of
ownership. Adverse possession law, both as applied by the Joseph court
and even more generally, evaluates the moral connection through the

373
While such a result might be surprising in the context of an adverse possession claim, it is
common in a quite similar context, namely that of the mistaken improver. See Kelvin H. Dickinson,
Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 74–75 (1985) (noting that to provide relief in
claims of mistaken improver, courts must evaluate both parties’ equities then fashion a flexible,
imaginative remedy).
374
Id. at 47.
375
For example, their connection to the property clearly satisfies Professor Radin’s notion of
“personal” property. Radin, supra note 320, at 960–61.
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376

“claim of right” element, as well as through the typically more objective
requirement of adverse and hostile behavior toward the true owner.377 By
contrast, the interest-outcome model would use a completely objective test
of use as a means of determining the connection. Thus, under the model,
the Whitcombes would have a very strong claim of a moral connection,
which, unless the court concluded that they were also the owners by means
of adverse possession,378 would limit the influence of ownership in shaping
the form and source of remedy. In this part of the test, Joseph’s status as a
bona fide purchaser would not help him a great deal.379 But by considering
entitlement last, the court could more likely arrange for Joseph and the
Whitcombes to each get something. Sharing would be a more viable
possibility.
An analysis of the Van Valkenburgh facts would proceed along quite
similar lines under the interest-outcome model, though it should also be
clear that the balance could be different both because the Lutzes’ “truck
farm” seemed to be less well received as a social and economic
contribution to the neighborhood,380 and also because the “true owner”
appeared to be completely absent and its intentions concerning future use
of the property may not have been possible to uncover.381 Given the
court’s more standard treatment of use as something to be encouraged by
an award of ownership so long as such use is appropriate, it is helpful to
use Van Valkenburgh to highlight the difference between adverse
possession doctrine and the model proposed here. In Van Valkenburgh, the
Lutzes lost all access to the property that they had reclaimed from
abandoned status for their own subsistence and shelter.382 In the model
proposed here, it is possible that questions about their contributions to the
community as well as the conflicting interests of the true owner might have
resulted in less complete use opportunities for the Lutzes than the
Whitcombes may have received. Nonetheless, this model would likely
conclude that the Lutzes should get something. This softening of the harsh
effects of ownership is a critical feature of the model, and indeed one of its
main virtues. It retrieves sharing from the shadows and promotes a
376
Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga. 1989); Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315
N.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Iowa 1982); Petsch v. Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 259–60 (Neb. 1983); Ellis v.
Jansing, 620 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. 1981); Grappo v. Blanks, 400 S.E.2d 168, 171 (Va. 1991).
377
See Richard Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339
(1983) (pointing out the majority shift away from the subjective Maine rule and toward the objective
Connecticut rule).
378
Note that this model would not remove a standard adverse possession analysis in the context of
determining ownership after determining whose use warranted some sort of remedy.
379
It would be helpful in other parts of the test, specifically in establishing his expectations
concerning use.
380
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 31 (N.Y. 1952) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
381
Id. at 30–33.
382
Id. at 30 (majority opinion).
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broader middle ground between all and nothing.
2. Trespass
Next, consider the facts of Shack under the interest-outcome approach.
Because Shack and Tejeras’s claims were based on the implicit right of the
migrant workers to remain on the property,383 this model would argue that
such an implicit right ought really to be analyzed as a remedial response to
a claim of exclusive ownership. In other words, in either typical or less
typical trespass cases, property law should be more conceptually open to
claims of sharing by non-owners. Trespass ought not to be a presumptive
bar to such claims. The question ought to be what the distributional effect
of any given remedy is on both the owner and non-owners, on both the
party bringing a claim and the parties defending against it. To promote
such a concept, this analysis will treat the migrant workers as having made
such a claim.
Beginning again with an analysis of the formal entitlements of each
party, Professor Singer’s model would go a long way toward capturing the
reality of relationships among the parties and the property in this case.
Using his model, a court could well conclude that the workers had formal
rights both as tenants and as employees. Thus, at the first stage of analysis,
the interest-outcome model may not add much more by virtue of its three
additional questions about use. In short, both the interest-outcome model
and an entitlement-centered model would capture the facts that the migrant
workers used the property both for farming, a means of livelihood, and for
shelter.384 It is true that both of these uses were temporary, given the
expectation that the workers would return to more permanent homes
outside the country during the colder months.385 Yet their use of the land
and their physical and psychological needs for shelter and support from it
were presumably deep and extensive.386 By the same token, as the farmer
who owned the land and from it earned his livelihood, Tedesco had a
connection to the property that was also deep and abiding.387 Indeed, the
interest-outcome model would urge a court to take Tedesco’s moral
connection into consideration in determining the relevance of ownership in
shaping the remedy. In these respects, both sets of parties had strong and
quite complementary intentions, as well as moral and physical connections
to the property.
The complementarity of the relationship was also likely what the “rest
383
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (noting that the centrality of Shack and
Tejeras’s interest is especially evident in the argument grounded in landlord-tenant law).
384
Id. at 370.
385
Id. at 372.
386
The opinion assumes as much in its discussion of the policy reasons to reject the trespass
argument. Id. at 372–73.
387
Id. at 370.
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of the world” perceived. Tedesco and the migrant workers acted as an
economic unit, contributing substantially to the local and regional
economy.388 The problem, of course, was that the monolithic right of
ownership protected Tedesco’s needs vis-à-vis the property, but not those
of the workers. Even Shack’s broad holding did not change the basic fact
of impermanence in the connection between the workers and the property.
In this critical respect, the decision could not contribute a great deal to
enhancing the workers’ “capabilities,” as defined by Professor
Nussbaum.389 In this respect also, the position of the individual workers
within a larger group that badly needed protections was a critical piece of
the story—as the court recognized but could only partially defend.390
We have repeatedly seen courts recognize these types of interests and
yet fail to protect them.391 As this Article has hypothesized, one reason
courts refuse to protect such strongly articulated interests is their
continuing discomfort with creating “rights” that conflict with those of the
formal owner. In a case such as Shack, the interest-outcome approach
provides a tool for courts to create such protections while leaving
ownership rights in place. As was suggested in the previous Part, a very
effective remedy in this case could have been to make more permanent the
reciprocal relationship between the farmer and workers while still leaving
Tedesco’s ownership rights intact.392 Such a remedy could have
accomplished the enhancements to the workers’ civil and political rights
(and freedoms) that were effectuated by the decision in Shack.393 But it
could also have protected the economic needs of the workers by giving
them a direct and continuing right to use the land.
Moreover, by focusing on outcomes to protect all legitimate interests,
the interest-outcome model could have recognized Tedesco’s rights using a
range of outcomes that ought to assuage the unease that some readers may
feel about the effect of this model on employment relationships. By
combining use-based remedies with more traditional liability rules, for
example, courts could quite effectively and creatively protect owners who
use their property in part to employ others. In the Shack case, the court
could impose a liability rule in the form of a set fee that workers would
388
See id. at 372 (describing the enormous economic impact provided by the migrant workers’
labor, as well as the large numbers of workers involved).
389
NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 80; see also Alexander, supra note 123, at 1855–56 (suggesting
that the right to exclude gives property owners almost total control over their assets).
390
Shack, 277 A.2d at 372–73.
391
See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th
Cir. 1980) (describing tragic consequences to families, cities, and regions if a steel mill ceased
operations); Shack, 277 A.2d at 372 (describing migrants as “rootless and isolated” and in need of
assistance on multiple fronts, but failing to grant an ownership interest in land worked).
392
See supra text accompanying note 339.
393
Shack, 277 A.2d at 374–75.
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have to pay for the opportunity to farm property on a more permanent
basis. Such a rule would protect the workers’ ability to use the property
while at the same time recognizing the “cost” to the owner of not having
the freedom to exclude workers at will.
3. Implied Easements
Finally, the model proposed here ought to diversify outcomes for the
better even in implied easements cases. In Stoner v. Zucker, for example,
where the court held that the defendants were “owners” of an implied
easement,394 the court quite possibly could have promoted a more efficient
and fairer outcome by requiring both parties to share the use of the right of
way as well as the cost of maintaining it. Such an outcome may well have
balanced out distributive imbalances that easements by estoppel doctrine
currently cannot accomplish. Alternatively, or in addition, the court could
have limited the plaintiff’s ownership of the right of way based on a range
of circumstances that could accomplish a more nuanced investigation of
legitimate interests than current doctrine allows. Again, the costs of
investigating use are already invested in these cases. Given that reality, the
granting of bundled ownership of rights of way, in which the owner owns
the right to exclude others, to transfer, and so on, seems particularly
contrived. Instead, it makes eminent sense for outcomes in these cases to
reflect, to the greatest extent possible, a more nuanced picture of
efficiency, fairness, and distributional considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
Although this Article has claimed a number of benefits for the interestoutcome model proposed here, ranging from ease of administration due to
the objective nature of the inquiry to better connections with social and
cultural context, the key benefits claimed are the greater potential for
property sharing and for more diverse and better outcomes in core
doctrinal areas. It is well, then, to end by elaborating the claimed benefits
of property sharing. In large part, such benefits are pragmatic in nature. In
a world where resources are increasingly scarce, legal decision makers
have no choice but to consider the larger-scale effects of property laws.
Core doctrines in property law wrestle with this reality by creating
exceptions, balancing tests, and implied rights. Although they muddy the
boundaries of property rights, these doctrinal moves acknowledge that
property laws cannot ignore the real-world effects of resource allocation on
those with few resources.
Theories focused on minimizing information costs are ineffective in
performing this task. Such theories work to reduce the costs invested in
394

Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809 (Cal. 1906).
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allowing current owners to exploit resources by allowing those owners to
determine the best uses for the resources. But often such theories do not
acknowledge the externalities resulting from the broad injunctions to “keep
out” that are required in order to minimize transaction costs. In addition,
such theories typically do not account for distributional injustices, focusing
as they do on reducing costs for current owners.395
Not surprisingly, given its orientation toward the impulses of the many
judges who observe the real-world effects of the externalities associated
with broad property rules, this model is an answer to the criticisms of
theories focusing on information costs. It is precisely the question of
equitable outcomes and fairer distributions that this model addresses as a
primary matter, demonstrating that in core doctrinal areas such a focus is
both possible and desirable. Importantly also, given the impulse toward
balancing tests and more nuanced considerations of use and access in these
areas, the model may well be equally as cost-effective a mode of dispute
resolution as that embodied in the ownership model that currently
predominates in these doctrines.396 In these respects, the interest-outcome
approach presented here uses an ancient mechanism to respond to a
compelling contemporary problem.

395
396

See supra text accompanying notes 109–11.
See supra Part III.

